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Ideas for 'works', 'Ontological Categories' and 'Philosophy of Logic'

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5. Theory of Logic / I. Semantics of Logic / 3. Logical Truth
Having a valid form doesn't ensure truth, as it may be meaningless [Putnam]
     Full Idea: I don't think all substitution-instances of a valid schema are 'true'; some are clearly meaningless, such as 'If all boojums are snarks and all snarks are egglehumphs, then all boojums are egglehumphs'.
     From: Hilary Putnam (Philosophy of Logic [1971], Ch.3)
     A reaction: This seems like a very good challenge to Quine's claim that it is only form which produces a logical truth. Keep deductive and semantic consequence separate, with two different types of 'logical truth'.