display all the ideas for this combination of texts
18 ideas
22154 | For Aristotle bivalence is a feature of reality [Aristotle, by Boulter] |
Full Idea: For Aristotle the principle of bivalence is primarily a principle of metaphysics, not logic. It applies to entities in the real order first, and to propositions in the rational order second. | |
From: report of Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE]) by Stephen Boulter - Why Medieval Philosophy Matters 5 | |
A reaction: This is because nothing is vague. Boulter says this is also the case with non-contradiction. I like this idea very much. I reject the Fregean picture of the autonomy of the rational order. Logic is powerful because it reflects reality. |
10801 | Either reference really matters, or we don't need to replace it with substitutions [Quine] |
Full Idea: When we reconstrue quantification in terms of substituted expressions rather than real values, we waive reference. ...but if reference matters, we cannot afford to waive it as a category; and if it does not, we do not need to. | |
From: Willard Quine (Reply to Professor Marcus [1962], p.183) | |
A reaction: An odd dilemma to pose. Presumably the substitution account is an attempt to explain how language actually works, without mentioning dubious direct ontological commitment in the quantifiers. |
11264 | Aporia 3: Does one science investigate all being, or does each kind of being have a science? [Aristotle, by Politis] |
Full Idea: Aporia 3: Is it the task of a single science to investigate all beings, or is it the task of fundamentally different sciences to investigate different kinds of being? | |
From: report of Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], 0997a15-25) by Vassilis Politis - Aristotle and the Metaphysics 3.4 | |
A reaction: One might ask whether neuroscience is entirely distinct from psychology, or partical physics from biology. |
11258 | We must start with our puzzles, and progress by solving them, as they reveal the real difficulty [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: We should first address those puzzles ('aporiai') that first arise. ..Subsequent progress depends on the resolution of the first puzzles, and one cannot solve these without knowing the difficulty, and our confusion shows this to be the case. | |
From: Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], 0995a27-) | |
A reaction: This stands in nice opposition to the Wittgenstein view, that confusion is largely a self-inflicted wound arising from our language, having little to do with reality. For Aristotle it is reality which is the source of our mental confusion. He's right. |
11265 | Aporia 4: Does metaphysics just investigate pure being, or also the characteristics of being? [Aristotle, by Politis] |
Full Idea: Aporia 4: Is the task of metaphysics only to investigate the (primary) beings or also to investigate the common characteristics of the (primary) beings? | |
From: report of Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], 0997a25-34) by Vassilis Politis - Aristotle and the Metaphysics 3.4 | |
A reaction: Politis points out that metaphysics would then be in danger of collapsing into all sorts of special sciences. |
11262 | Aporia 1: is there one science of explanation, or many? [Aristotle, by Politis] |
Full Idea: Aporia 1: Is it the task of a single science to investigate all the different causes and explanations of things, or is this the task of fundamentally different sciences? | |
From: report of Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], 0996a18-b26) by Vassilis Politis - Aristotle and the Metaphysics 3.4 | |
A reaction: [This is the 10,000th idea to be entered into this database - 1st February 2010, at 7:21pm] I think there are two sorts of philosopher - those, like myself, who cling on to the idea of one science, and the pluralists, perfectly happy with many. |
11263 | Aporia 2: Does one science investigate both ultimate and basic principles of being? [Aristotle, by Politis] |
Full Idea: Aporia 2: Is it the task of a single science to investigate both the ultimate principles of being and the basic principles of reasoning (e.g. non-contradiction)? Or is this the task of fundamentally different sciences? | |
From: report of Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], 0996b26-997a15) by Vassilis Politis - Aristotle and the Metaphysics 3.4 | |
A reaction: Although I favour the dream of one science dealing with everything, I hesitate over this aporia. I like the unity of modern science and metaphysics, but maybe logic precedes them both and has a different basis. Nice question! |
11266 | Aporia 5: Do other things exist besides what is perceptible by the senses? [Aristotle, by Politis] |
Full Idea: Aporia 5: Do only sense-perceptible things exist or do non-sense-perceptible things exist, too, in addition to or besides (para) sense-perceptible ones? | |
From: report of Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], 0997a34-998a19) by Vassilis Politis - Aristotle and the Metaphysics 3.4 | |
A reaction: Nowadays we have discovered so much that is beyond our natural perceptions that it is obvious that there may be stuff we can never detect. ...And yet if 'to exist is to have causal powers' then everything would be detectable in principle. Hm. |
11270 | Aporia 9: Is there one principle, or one kind of principle? [Aristotle, by Politis] |
Full Idea: Aporia 9: Are principles one in kind, or one in number? | |
From: report of Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], 0999b24-1000a04) by Vassilis Politis - Aristotle and the Metaphysics 3.4 | |
A reaction: A key aporia, which can be answered in both directions. In what respects are the essences of two different human beings identical? It is a key question for any essentialist. |
11267 | Aporia 6: Are the basic principles of a thing the kinds to which it belongs, or its components? [Aristotle, by Politis] |
Full Idea: Aporia 6: Are the principles of a thing the kinds to which the thing belongs or are they rather the ultimate elements that are present in the thing and compose the thing? | |
From: report of Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], 0998a20-b13) by Vassilis Politis - Aristotle and the Metaphysics 3.4 | |
A reaction: This is the heart of the modern debate on essentialism, between sortal essentialists (Brody and Wiggins) and those basing essences on powers and basic stuff (Ellis, Fine). I say the sortal bunch are wrong, wrong, wrong. |
11268 | Aporia 7: Is a thing's kind the most general one, or the most specific one? [Aristotle, by Politis] |
Full Idea: Aporia 7: If a thing's principle is its general kind, is that the most general kind to which it belongs, or the least general kind to which it belongs? | |
From: report of Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], 0998b13-999a23) by Vassilis Politis - Aristotle and the Metaphysics 3.4 | |
A reaction: This is a question for the sortal essentialists. I think it amounts to an argument against sortal essentialism, because there are nested kinds, and nothing to decide which one of them matters, |
11269 | Aporia 8: Are there general kinds, or merely particulars? [Aristotle, by Politis] |
Full Idea: Aporia 8: Do general kinds exist at all, in addition to the sense-perceptible particulars? | |
From: report of Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], 0999a24-b24) by Vassilis Politis - Aristotle and the Metaphysics 3.4 | |
A reaction: Aristotle is beginning to confront the whole issue of natural kinds. It seems OK to say that the elements are natural kinds, but things get more difficult when you talk about 'planets' or 'tigers'. Aristotle decides there are natural kinds. |
11271 | Aporia 10: Do perishables and imperishables have the same principle? [Aristotle, by Politis] |
Full Idea: Aporia 10: Are the principles of perishable and imperishable things the same, or different? | |
From: report of Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], 1000a05-1001a03) by Vassilis Politis - Aristotle and the Metaphysics 3.4 | |
A reaction: Locke proposed that having a 'life' was an essential distinction between these two, but this has been rather undermined by modern biochemistry. Aristotle wants to know if nature is a unity. |
11272 | Aporia 11: Are primary being and unity distinct, or only in the things that are? [Aristotle, by Politis] |
Full Idea: Aporia 11: Is primary being simply being itself and unity itself, or is primary being rather things that are and are one? | |
From: report of Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], 1001a04--b25) by Vassilis Politis - Aristotle and the Metaphysics 3.4 | |
A reaction: I can't make sense of 'being' in itself, though Heidegger seems to have devoted his life to the idea. It appears that Aristotle agrees with me. |
11273 | Aporia 12: Do mathematical entities exist independently, or only in objects? [Aristotle, by Politis] |
Full Idea: Aporia 12: Are numbers, solids, surfaces and points themselves the primary beings or are they primary beings only because other things (e.g. this horse) have such geometrical and in general mathematical properties? | |
From: report of Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], 1001b26-1002b11) by Vassilis Politis - Aristotle and the Metaphysics 3.4 | |
A reaction: The thinking of Pythagoras and Plato hovers behind this question. Aristotle seems to be groping for a compromise view. |
11274 | Aporia 13: Are there kinds, as well as particulars and mathematical entities? [Aristotle, by Politis] |
Full Idea: Aporia 13: Are there kinds ('eidé') in addition to or besides both sense-perceptible things and the entities postulated by mathematics? | |
From: report of Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], 1002b12-32) by Vassilis Politis - Aristotle and the Metaphysics 3.4 | |
A reaction: This seems close to Aporia 8 (Idea 11269). I can't make sense of a kind which has no particulars, except as a fond memory, like the dodo, and a fictional entity like the gryphon. ...Or perhaps something we aim to bio-engineer. |
11276 | Aporia 15: Are the causes of things universals or particulars? [Aristotle, by Politis] |
Full Idea: Aporia 15: Are the principles of things universals or particulars? | |
From: report of Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], 1003a05-17) by Vassilis Politis - Aristotle and the Metaphysics 3.4 | |
A reaction: Aristotle seems to be groping for a compromise answer. Explanations must be universal, but primary being seems to reside in the particulars. The modern idea of Aristotelianism is universals-only-in-particulars. |
11275 | Aporia 14: Are ultimate causes of things potentialities, or must they be actual? [Aristotle, by Politis] |
Full Idea: Aporia 14: Are the elements of things potentialities and capacities for causing and generating those things or are they what actually causes and generates those things? | |
From: report of Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], 1002b32-1003a05) by Vassilis Politis - Aristotle and the Metaphysics 3.4 | |
A reaction: We would now call this a question about 'dispositions', and the consensus seems to be that they are potential rather than actual, since a vase may be fragile without having to actually break. |