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Ideas for 'Saundaranandakavya', 'works' and 'Philosophical Logic'

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5. Theory of Logic / L. Paradox / 6. Paradoxes in Language / a. The Liar paradox
The Liar seems like a truth-value 'gap', but dialethists see it as a 'glut' [Burgess]
     Full Idea: It is a common view that the liar sentence ('This very sentence is not true') is an instance of a truth-value gap (neither true nor false), but some dialethists cite it as an example of a truth-value glut (both true and false).
     From: John P. Burgess (Philosophical Logic [2009], 5.7)
     A reaction: The defence of the glut view must be that it is true, then it is false, then it is true... Could it manage both at once?