display all the ideas for this combination of texts
3 ideas
| 21643 | The inferential quantifier focuses on truth; the domain quantifier focuses on reality [Hofweber] |
| Full Idea: When we ask 'is there a number?' in its inferential role (or internalist) reading, then we ask whether or not there is a true instance of 't is a number'. When we ask in its domain conditions (externalist) reading, we ask if the world contains a number. | |
| From: Thomas Hofweber (Ontology and the Ambitions of Metaphysics [2016], 03.6) | |
| A reaction: Hofweber's key distinction. The distinction between making truth prior and making reference prior is intriguing and important. The internalist version is close to substitutional quantification. Only the externalist view needs robust reference. |
| 11149 | Affirming/denying sentences are universal, particular, or indeterminate [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: Affirming/denying sentences are universal, particular, or indeterminate. Belonging 'to every/to none' is universal; belonging 'to some/not to some/not to every' is particular; belonging or not belonging (without universal/particular) is indeterminate. | |
| From: Aristotle (Prior Analytics [c.328 BCE], 24a16) |
| 8079 | Aristotelian logic has two quantifiers of the subject ('all' and 'some') [Aristotle, by Devlin] |
| Full Idea: Aristotelian logic has two quantifiers of the subject ('all' and 'some'), and two ways to combine the subject with the predicate ('have', and 'have not'), giving four propositions: all-s-have-p, all-s-have-not-p, some-s-have-p, and some-s-have-not-p. | |
| From: report of Aristotle (Prior Analytics [c.328 BCE]) by Keith Devlin - Goodbye Descartes Ch.2 | |
| A reaction: Frege seems to have switched from 'some' to 'at-least-one'. Since then other quantifiers have been proposed. See, for example, Ideas 7806 and 6068. |