Combining Texts

Ideas for 'Issues of Pragmaticism', 'Quantification and Descriptions' and 'The Nature of Mathematics'

unexpand these ideas     |    start again     |     choose another area for these texts

display all the ideas for this combination of texts

---

2 ideas

5. Theory of Logic / C. Ontology of Logic / 3. If-Thenism

14783	Logic, unlike mathematics, is not hypothetical; it asserts categorical ends from hypothetical means [Peirce]
	Full Idea: Mathematics is purely hypothetical: it produces nothing but conditional propositions. Logic, on the contrary, is categorical in its assertions. True, it is a normative science, and not a mere discovery of what really is. It discovers ends from means.
	From: Charles Sanders Peirce (The Nature of Mathematics [1898], II)

5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 2. Descriptions / b. Definite descriptions

18774	Definite descriptions, unlike proper names, have a logical structure [Linsky,B]
	Full Idea: Definite descriptions seem to have a logical structure in a way that proper names do not.
	From: Bernard Linsky (Quantification and Descriptions [2014], 1.1.1)
	A reaction: Thus descriptions have implications which plain names do not.