Combining Texts

Ideas for 'fragments/reports', 'The Epic of Gilgamesh' and 'Philosophy of Mathematics'

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3 ideas

5. Theory of Logic / B. Logical Consequence / 2. Types of Consequence
The two standard explanations of consequence are semantic (in models) and deductive [Shapiro]
     Full Idea: The two best historical explanations of consequence are the semantic (model-theoretic), and the deductive versions.
     From: Stewart Shapiro (Philosophy of Mathematics [1997], 7.2)
     A reaction: Shapiro points out the fictionalists are in trouble here, because the first involves commitment to sets, and the second to the existence of deductions.
5. Theory of Logic / B. Logical Consequence / 5. Modus Ponens
Modus ponens is one of five inference rules identified by the Stoics [Chrysippus, by Devlin]
     Full Idea: Modus ponens is just one of the five different inference rules identified by the Stoics.
     From: report of Chrysippus (fragments/reports [c.240 BCE]) by Keith Devlin - Goodbye Descartes Ch.2
     A reaction: Modus ponens strikes me as being more like a definition of implication than a 'rule'. Implication is what gets you from one truth to another. All the implications of a truth must also be true.
Intuitionism only sanctions modus ponens if all three components are proved [Shapiro]
     Full Idea: In some intuitionist semantics modus ponens is not sanctioned. At any given time there is likely to be a conditional such that it and its antecedent have been proved, but nobody has bothered to prove the consequent.
     From: Stewart Shapiro (Philosophy of Mathematics [1997], 6.7)
     A reaction: [He cites Heyting] This is a bit baffling. In what sense can 'it' (i.e. the conditional implication) have been 'proved' if the consequent doesn't immediately follow? Proving both propositions seems to make the conditional redundant.