Combining Texts

Ideas for 'fragments/reports', 'Necessary Truth' and 'Parts of Classes'

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4 ideas

5. Theory of Logic / B. Logical Consequence / 5. Modus Ponens
Modus ponens is one of five inference rules identified by the Stoics [Chrysippus, by Devlin]
     Full Idea: Modus ponens is just one of the five different inference rules identified by the Stoics.
     From: report of Chrysippus (fragments/reports [c.240 BCE]) by Keith Devlin - Goodbye Descartes Ch.2
     A reaction: Modus ponens strikes me as being more like a definition of implication than a 'rule'. Implication is what gets you from one truth to another. All the implications of a truth must also be true.
5. Theory of Logic / D. Assumptions for Logic / 2. Excluded Middle
Every proposition is either true or false [Chrysippus, by Cicero]
     Full Idea: We hold fast to the position, defended by Chrysippus, that every proposition is either true or false.
     From: report of Chrysippus (fragments/reports [c.240 BCE]) by M. Tullius Cicero - On Fate ('De fato') 38
     A reaction: I am intrigued to know exactly how you defend this claim. It may depend what you mean by a proposition. A badly expressed proposition may have indeterminate truth, quite apart from the vague, the undecidable etc.
5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 6. Plural Quantification
Plural quantification lacks a complete axiom system [Lewis]
     Full Idea: There is an irremediable lack of a complete axiom system for plural quantification.
     From: David Lewis (Parts of Classes [1991], 4.7)
I like plural quantification, but am not convinced of its connection with second-order logic [Lewis]
     Full Idea: I agree fully with Boolos on substantive questions about plural quantification, though I would make less than he does of the connection with second-order logic.
     From: David Lewis (Parts of Classes [1991], 3.2 n2)
     A reaction: Deep matters, but my inclination is to agree with Lewis, as I have never been able to see why talk of plural quantification led straight on to second-order logic. A plural is just some objects, not some higher-order entity.