Combining Texts

Ideas for 'The Correspondence Theory of Truth', '(Nonsolipsistic) Conceptual Role Semantics' and 'The Metaontology of Abstraction'

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4 ideas

5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 1. Overview of Logic
12595 We have a theory of logic (implication and inconsistency), but not of inference or reasoning [Harman]
     Full Idea: There is as yet no substantial theory of inference or reasoning. To be sure, logic is well developed; but logic is not a theory of inference or reasoning. Logic is a theory of implication and inconsistency.
     From: Gilbert Harman ((Nonsolipsistic) Conceptual Role Semantics [1987], 12.2.2)
     A reaction: One problem is that animals can draw inferences without the use of language, and I presume we do so all the time, so it is hard to see how to formalise such an activity.
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 4. Pure Logic
3746 Logic seems to work for unasserted sentences [O'Connor]
     Full Idea: If sentences can have truth-values only when they occur as asserted, it would be impossible to have a truth-functional basis to logic.
     From: D.J. O'Connor (The Correspondence Theory of Truth [1975], Ch.6)
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 2. Logical Connectives / d. and
12597 I might accept P and Q as likely, but reject P-and-Q as unlikely [Harman]
     Full Idea: Principles of implication imply there is not a purely probabilistic rule of acceptance for belief. Otherwise one might accept P and Q, without accepting their conjunction, if the conjuncts have a high probability, but the conjunction doesn't.
     From: Gilbert Harman ((Nonsolipsistic) Conceptual Role Semantics [1987], 12.2.2)
     A reaction: [Idea from Scott Soames] I am told that my friend A has just won a very big lottery prize, and am then told that my friend B has also won a very big lottery prize. The conjunction seems less believable; I begin to suspect a conspiracy.
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / d. Singular terms
12230 Singular terms refer if they make certain atomic statements true [Hale/Wright]
     Full Idea: Anyone should agree that a justification for regarding a singular term as having objectual reference is provided just as soon as one has justification for regarding as true certain atomic statements in which it functions as a singular term.
     From: B Hale / C Wright (The Metaontology of Abstraction [2009], §9)
     A reaction: The meat of this idea is hidden in the word 'certain'. See Idea 10314 for Hale's explanation. Without that, the proposal strikes me as absurd.