Combining Texts

Ideas for 'fragments/reports', 'An Inquiry into Meaning and Truth' and 'Proslogion'

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8 ideas

5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 4. Pure Logic
The physical world doesn't need logic, but the mental world does [Russell]
     Full Idea: The non-mental world can be completely described without the use of any logical word, …but when it comes to the mental world, there are facts which cannot be mentioned without the use of logical words.
     From: Bertrand Russell (An Inquiry into Meaning and Truth [1940], 5)
     A reaction: He adds that logical words are not needed for physics, but are needed for psychology. I love Russell's interest in the psychology of logic (in defiance of the anti-psychologism of Frege). See also the ideas of Robert Hanna.
5. Theory of Logic / D. Assumptions for Logic / 2. Excluded Middle
Questions wouldn't lead anywhere without the law of excluded middle [Russell]
     Full Idea: Without the law of excluded middle, we could not ask the questions that give rise to discoveries.
     From: Bertrand Russell (An Inquiry into Meaning and Truth [1940], c.p.88)
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 2. Logical Connectives / e. or
A disjunction expresses indecision [Russell]
     Full Idea: A disjunction is the verbal expression of indecision, or, if a question, of the desire to reach a decision.
     From: Bertrand Russell (An Inquiry into Meaning and Truth [1940], 5)
     A reaction: Russell is fishing here for Grice's conversational implicature. If you want to assert a simple proposition, you don't introduce it into an irrelevant disjunction, because that would have a particular expressive purpose.
'Or' expresses hesitation, in a dog at a crossroads, or birds risking grabbing crumbs [Russell]
     Full Idea: Psychologically, 'or' corresponds to a state of hesitation. A dog waits at a fork in the road, to see which way you are going. For crumbs on a windowsill, birds behave in a manner we would express by 'shall I be brave, or go hungry?'.
     From: Bertrand Russell (An Inquiry into Meaning and Truth [1940], 5)
     A reaction: I love two facts here - first, that Russell wants to link the connective to the psychology of experience, and second, that a great logician wants to connect his logic to the minds of animals.
'Or' expresses a mental state, not something about the world [Russell]
     Full Idea: When we assert 'p or q' we are in a state which is derivative from two previous states, and we express this state, not something about the world.
     From: Bertrand Russell (An Inquiry into Meaning and Truth [1940], 5)
     A reaction: His example: at a junction this road or that road goes to Oxford, but the world only contains the roads, not some state of 'this or that road'. He doesn't deny that in one sense 'p or q' tells you something about the world.
Maybe the 'or' used to describe mental states is not the 'or' of logic [Russell]
     Full Idea: It might be contended that, in describing what happens when a man believes 'p or q', the 'or' that we must use is not the same as the 'or' of logic.
     From: Bertrand Russell (An Inquiry into Meaning and Truth [1940], 5)
     A reaction: This seems to be the general verdict on Russell's enquiries in this chapter, but I love any attempt, however lacking in rigour etc., to connect formal logic to how we think, and thence to the world.
Disjunction may also arise in practice if there is imperfect memory. [Russell]
     Full Idea: Another situation in which a disjunction may arise is practice is imperfect memory. 'Either Brown or Jones told me that'.
     From: Bertrand Russell (An Inquiry into Meaning and Truth [1940], 5)
5. Theory of Logic / L. Paradox / 6. Paradoxes in Language / c. Grelling's paradox
A 'heterological' predicate can't be predicated of itself; so is 'heterological' heterological? Yes=no! [Russell]
     Full Idea: A predicate is 'heterological' when it cannot be predicated of itself; thus 'long' is heterological because it is not a long word, but 'short' is homological. So is 'heterological' heterological? Either answer leads to a contradiction.
     From: Bertrand Russell (An Inquiry into Meaning and Truth [1940], 5)
     A reaction: [Grelling's Paradox] Yes: 'heterological' is heterological because it isn't heterological; No: it isn't, because it is. Russell says we therefore need a hierarchy of languages (types), and the word 'word' is outside the system.