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Ideas for 'fragments/reports', 'LOT 2' and 'How to Define Theoretical Terms'

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4 ideas

5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 2. Logical Connectives / d. and
12664 A truth-table, not inferential role, defines 'and' [Fodor]
     Full Idea: I'm inclined to think that 'and' is defined by its truth-table (and not, for example, by its 'inferential-role').
     From: Jerry A. Fodor (LOT 2 [2008], Ch.7)
     A reaction: Sounds right, on my general principle that something can only have a function if it has an intrinsic nature. The truth-table just formalises normal understanding of 'and', according to what it makes true.
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / a. Names
12648 Names in thought afford a primitive way to bring John before the mind [Fodor]
     Full Idea: Names in thought (in contrast to, say, descriptions in thought) afford a primitive way of bringing John before the mind.
     From: Jerry A. Fodor (LOT 2 [2008], Ch.3 App)
     A reaction: I think the 'file' account of concepts which Fodor has now latched onto gives a wonderful account of names. They are simple if you haven't opened the file yet (like 'Louis', in Evans's example).
12650 'Paderewski' has two names in mentalese, for his pianist file and his politician file [Fodor]
     Full Idea: Paderewski (as pianist and as politician) has two names in Mentalese. If you think there are two Paderewskis, it's important that what you get when you retrieve the pianist file differs from the politician file. You can then merge the two files.
     From: Jerry A. Fodor (LOT 2 [2008], Ch.3 App)
     A reaction: The same will apply to 'Hespherus' and 'Phosphorus'. We can re-separate the 'morning star' and 'evening star' files if we wish to discuss ancient Egyptian attitudes to such things. I love this idea of Fodor's. Explanations flow from it.
5. Theory of Logic / K. Features of Logics / 2. Consistency
12656 P-and-Q gets its truth from the truth of P and truth of Q, but consistency isn't like that [Fodor]
     Full Idea: The truth of P-and-Q is (roughly) a function of the truth of P and the truth of Q; but the consistency of P&Q isn't a function of the consistency of P and the consistency of Q.
     From: Jerry A. Fodor (LOT 2 [2008], Ch.4.5 n33)
     A reaction: This is a nice deep issue. Fodor is interested in artificial intelligence at this point, but I am interested in the notion of coherence, as found in good justifications. Even consistency isn't elementary logic, never mind coherence.