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Ideas for 'Sweet Dreams', 'A Realist Theory of Science' and 'Two Dogmas of Empiricism'

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5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / f. Names eliminated

9204	Quine's arguments fail because he naively conflates names with descriptions [Fine,K on Quine]
	Full Idea: Quine's logical argument against modality presupposes a naïve view of singular terms under which no significant distinction is to be drawn between the use of names and descriptions.
	From: comment on Willard Quine (Two Dogmas of Empiricism [1953]) by Kit Fine - Intro to 'Modality and Tense' p. 6
	A reaction: See Idea 9201 for Quine's argument. The question is whether '9' and 'the number of planets' are names or descriptions. The 'number of planets' is not remotely descriptive of 9, so it must be referential. So '9' is a name? Hm.