Combining Texts

Ideas for 'works', 'On What There Is' and 'The Idea of the Brain'

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5 ideas

5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 2. Logical Connectives / c. not

21777	Negation of negation doubles back into a self-relationship [Hegel, by Houlgate]
	Full Idea: For Hegel, the 'negation of negation' is negation that, as it were, doubles back on itself and 'relates itself to itself'.
	From: report of Georg W.F.Hegel (works [1812]) by Stephen Houlgate - An Introduction to Hegel 6 'Space'
	A reaction: [ref VNP 1823 p.108] Glad we've cleared that one up.

5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 4. Variables in Logic

1618	We study bound variables not to know reality, but to know what reality language asserts [Quine]
	Full Idea: We look to bound variables in connection with ontology not in order to know what there is, but in order to know what a given remark or doctrine, ours or someone else's, says there is.
	From: Willard Quine (On What There Is [1948], p.15)

5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / f. Names eliminated

8455	Canonical notation needs quantification, variables and predicates, but not names [Quine, by Orenstein]
	Full Idea: Quine says that names need not be part of one's canonical notation; in fact, whatever scientific purposes are accomplished by names can be carried out just as well by the devices of quantification, variables and predicates.
	From: report of Willard Quine (On What There Is [1948]) by Alex Orenstein - W.V. Quine Ch.2
	A reaction: This is part of Quine's analysis of where the ontological commitment of a language is to be found. Kripke's notion that a name baptises an item comes as a challenge to this view.

8456	Quine extended Russell's defining away of definite descriptions, to also define away names [Quine, by Orenstein]
	Full Idea: Quine extended Russell's theory for defining away definite descriptions, so that he could also define away names.
	From: report of Willard Quine (On What There Is [1948]) by Alex Orenstein - W.V. Quine Ch.2
	A reaction: Quine also gets rid of universals and properties, so his ontology is squeezed from both the semantic and the metaphysical directions. Quine seems to be the key figure in modern ontology. If you want to expand it (E.J. Lowe), justify yourself to Quine.

5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 2. Descriptions / c. Theory of definite descriptions

1611	Names can be converted to descriptions, and Russell showed how to eliminate those [Quine]
	Full Idea: I have shown that names can be converted to descriptions, and Russell has shown that descriptions can be eliminated.
	From: Willard Quine (On What There Is [1948], p.12)