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16908 | We can dispense with self-evidence, if language itself prevents logical mistakes [Jeshion on Wittgenstein] |
Full Idea: The 'self-evidence' of which Russell talks so much can only be dispensed with in logic if language itself prevents any logical mistake. | |
From: comment on Ludwig Wittgenstein (Notebooks 1914-1916 [1915], 4) by Robin Jeshion - Frege's Notion of Self-Evidence 4 | |
A reaction: Jeshion presents this as a key idea, turning against Frege, and is the real source of the 'linguistic turn' in philosophy. If self-evidence is abandoned, then language itself is the guide to truth, so study language. I think I prefer Frege. See Quine? |