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Ideas for 'The Varieties of Necessity', 'Ontological Categories' and 'Philosophical Logic'

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2 ideas

5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / a. Names
13134 We negate predicates but do not negate names [Westerhoff]
     Full Idea: We negate predicates but do not negate names.
     From: Jan Westerhoff (Ontological Categories [2005], §88)
     A reaction: This is a point for anyone like Ramsey who wants to collapse the distinction between particulars and universals, or singular terms and their predicates.
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 2. Descriptions / b. Definite descriptions
15414 The denotation of a definite description is flexible, rather than rigid [Burgess]
     Full Idea: By contrast to rigidly designating proper names, …the denotation of definite descriptions is (in general) not rigid but flexible.
     From: John P. Burgess (Philosophical Logic [2009], 2.9)
     A reaction: This modern way of putting it greatly clarifies why Russell was interested in the type of reference involved in definite descriptions. Obviously some descriptions (such as 'the only person who could ever have…') might be rigid.