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Ideas for 'fragments/reports', 'On Fate ('De fato')' and 'The Concept of Truth for Formalized Languages'

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5. Theory of Logic / L. Paradox / 6. Paradoxes in Language / a. The Liar paradox

8940	Tarski avoids the Liar Paradox, because truth cannot be asserted within the object language [Tarski, by Fisher]
	Full Idea: In Tarski's account of truth, self-reference (as found in the Liar Paradox) is prevented because the truth predicate for any given object language is never a part of that object language, and so a sentence can never predicate truth of itself.
	From: report of Alfred Tarski (The Concept of Truth for Formalized Languages [1933]) by Jennifer Fisher - On the Philosophy of Logic 03.I
	A reaction: Thus we solve the Liar Paradox by ruling that 'you are not allowed to say that'. Hm. The slightly odd result is that in any conversation about whether p is true, we end up using (logically speaking) two different languages simultaneously. Hm.