Combining Texts

Ideas for 'Individuals without Sortals', 'On 'Insolubilia' and their solution' and 'Unpublished Notebooks 1885-86'

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3 ideas

5. Theory of Logic / C. Ontology of Logic / 1. Ontology of Logic
Logic is a fiction, which invents the view that one thought causes another [Nietzsche]
     Full Idea: The model of a complete fiction is logic. Here a thinking is made up where a thought is posited as the cause of another thought.
     From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Unpublished Notebooks 1885-86 [1886], 34[249])
     A reaction: He could almost be referring to Frege's Third Realm. Most hard core analytic philosophers seem to think that propositions have tight logical relationships which are nothing to do with the people who think them.
5. Theory of Logic / L. Paradox / 4. Paradoxes in Logic / d. Richard's paradox
Richard's puzzle uses the notion of 'definition' - but that cannot be defined [Russell]
     Full Idea: In Richard's puzzle, we use the notion of 'definition', and this, oddly enough, is not definable, and is indeed not a definite notion at all.
     From: Bertrand Russell (On 'Insolubilia' and their solution [1906], p.209)
     A reaction: The background for this claim is his type theory, which renders certain forms of circular reference meaningless.
5. Theory of Logic / L. Paradox / 6. Paradoxes in Language / a. The Liar paradox
Vicious Circle: what involves ALL must not be one of those ALL [Russell]
     Full Idea: The 'vicious-circle principle' says 'whatever involves an apparent variable must not be among the possible values of that variable', or (less exactly) 'whatever involves ALL must not be one of ALL which it involves.
     From: Bertrand Russell (On 'Insolubilia' and their solution [1906], p.204)
     A reaction: He offers this as a parallel to his 'no classes' principle. That referred to classes, but this refers to propositions, and specifically the Liar Paradox (which he calls the 'Epimenedes').