Combining Texts

Ideas for 'Truth and the Past', 'Apriority as an Evaluative Notion' and 'What Required for Foundation for Maths?'

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4 ideas

5. Theory of Logic / K. Features of Logics / 1. Axiomatisation
'Classificatory' axioms aim at revealing similarity in morphology of structures [Mayberry]
     Full Idea: The purpose of a 'classificatory' axiomatic theory is to single out an otherwise disparate species of structures by fixing certain features of morphology. ...The aim is to single out common features.
     From: John Mayberry (What Required for Foundation for Maths? [1994], p.406-2)
Axiomatiation relies on isomorphic structures being essentially the same [Mayberry]
     Full Idea: The central dogma of the axiomatic method is this: isomorphic structures are mathematically indistinguishable in their essential properties.
     From: John Mayberry (What Required for Foundation for Maths? [1994], p.406-2)
     A reaction: Hence it is not that we have to settle for the success of a system 'up to isomorphism', since that was the original aim. The structures must differ in their non-essential properties, or they would be the same system.
'Eliminatory' axioms get rid of traditional ideal and abstract objects [Mayberry]
     Full Idea: The purpose of what I am calling 'eliminatory' axiomatic theories is precisely to eliminate from mathematics those peculiar ideal and abstract objects that, on the traditional view, constitute its subject matter.
     From: John Mayberry (What Required for Foundation for Maths? [1994], p.407-1)
     A reaction: A very interesting idea. I have a natural antipathy to 'abstract objects', because they really mess up what could otherwise be a very tidy ontology. What he describes might be better called 'ignoring' axioms. The objects may 'exist', but who cares?
5. Theory of Logic / K. Features of Logics / 6. Compactness
No logic which can axiomatise arithmetic can be compact or complete [Mayberry]
     Full Idea: No logic which can axiomatise arithmetic can be compact or complete.
     From: John Mayberry (What Required for Foundation for Maths? [1994], p.412-1)
     A reaction: I take this to be because there are new truths in the transfinite level (as well as the problem of incompleteness).