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Ideas for 'Mahaprajnaparamitashastra', 'Philosophical Investigations' and 'Material Beings'

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6 ideas

5. Theory of Logic / D. Assumptions for Logic / 2. Excluded Middle
17587 The 'Law' of Excluded Middle needs all propositions to be definitely true or definitely false [Inwagen]
     Full Idea: I think the validity of the 'Law' of Excluded Middle depends on the assumption that every proposition is definitely true or definitely false.
     From: Peter van Inwagen (Material Beings [1990], 18)
     A reaction: I think this is confused. He cites vagueness as the problem, but that is a problem for Bivalence. If excluded middle is read as 'true or not-true', that leaves the meaning of 'not-true' open, and never mentions the bivalent 'false'.
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 1. Logical Form
18743 Wittgenstein says we want the grammar of problems, not their first-order logical structure [Wittgenstein, by Horsten/Pettigrew]
     Full Idea: For the later Wittgenstein what we should be after is the grammatical structure of philosophical problems, not the first-order logical structure of such problems.
     From: report of Ludwig Wittgenstein (Philosophical Investigations [1952]) by Horsten,L/Pettigrew,R - Mathematical Methods in Philosophy 2
     A reaction: This is the most sympathetic spin I have ever seen put on the apparent rather anti-philosophical later Wittgenstein. I nurse doubts about highly formal approaches to philosophy, and maybe 'grammar' (whatever that is) is our target.
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 4. Variables in Logic
17558 Variables are just like pronouns; syntactic explanations get muddled over dummy letters [Inwagen]
     Full Idea: Explanations in terms of syntax do not satisfactorily distinguish true variables from dummy or schematic letters. Identifying variables with pronouns, however, provides a genuine explanation of what variables are.
     From: Peter van Inwagen (Material Beings [1990], 02)
     A reaction: I like this because it shows that our ordinary thought and speech use variables all the time ('I've forgotten something - what was it?'). He says syntax is fine for maths, but not for ordinary understanding.
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / a. Names
4139 Naming is a preparation for description [Wittgenstein]
     Full Idea: Naming is a preparation for description.
     From: Ludwig Wittgenstein (Philosophical Investigations [1952], §049)
     A reaction: Something has to be the starting point for a description. And yet a description could turn out to be an elaborate name.
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / b. Names as descriptive
4946 A name is not determined by a description, but by a cluster or family [Wittgenstein, by Kripke]
     Full Idea: According to Wittgenstein (and Searle) the referent of a name is determined not by a single description but by some cluster or family.
     From: report of Ludwig Wittgenstein (Philosophical Investigations [1952], §079) by Saul A. Kripke - Naming and Necessity lectures Lecture 1
     A reaction: It is because of this characteristically woolly, indeterminate and relativist view of Wittgenstein that I (and most people) find Kripke's notion of a 'baptism' so refreshing. It cuts throught the fog of language, and connects to reality.
5. Theory of Logic / L. Paradox / 6. Paradoxes in Language / b. The Heap paradox ('Sorites')
17583 There are no heaps [Inwagen]
     Full Idea: Fortunately ....there are no heaps.
     From: Peter van Inwagen (Material Beings [1990], 18)
     A reaction: This is the nihilist view of (inorganic) physical objects. If a wild view solves all sorts of problems, one should take it serious. It is why I take reductive physicalism about the mind seriously. (Well, it's true, actually)