Combining Texts

Ideas for 'Mahaprajnaparamitashastra', 'Guidebook to Wittgenstein's Tractatus' and 'On Interpretation'

unexpand these ideas     |    start again     |     choose another area for these texts

display all the ideas for this combination of texts

4 ideas

5. Theory of Logic / D. Assumptions for Logic / 1. Bivalence
23484 Bipolarity adds to Bivalence the capacity for both truth values [Morris,M]
     Full Idea: According to the Principle of Bipolarity, every meaningful sentence must be capable both of being true and of being false. It is not enough merely that every sentence must be either true or false (which is Bivalence).
     From: Michael Morris (Guidebook to Wittgenstein's Tractatus [2008], 3D)
     A reaction: It is said that early Wittgenstein endorses this. That is, in addition to being true, the sentence must be capable of falsehood (and vice versa). This seems to be flirting with the verification principle. I presume it is 'affirmative' sentences.
21593 In talking of future sea-fights, Aristotle rejects bivalence [Aristotle, by Williamson]
     Full Idea: Unlike Aristotle, Stoics did not reject Bivalence for future contingencies; it is true or false that there will be a sea-fight tomorrow.
     From: report of Aristotle (On Interpretation [c.330 BCE], 19a31) by Timothy Williamson - Vagueness 1.2
     A reaction: I'd never quite registered this simple account of the sea-fight. As Williamson emphasises, one should not lightly reject the principle of bivalence. Has Aristotle entered a slippery slope? Stoics disagreed with Aristotle.
5. Theory of Logic / D. Assumptions for Logic / 2. Excluded Middle
1701 A prayer is a sentence which is neither true nor false [Aristotle]
     Full Idea: A prayer is a sentence which is neither true nor false.
     From: Aristotle (On Interpretation [c.330 BCE], 17a01)
5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 1. Quantification
23494 Conjunctive and disjunctive quantifiers are too specific, and are confined to the finite [Morris,M]
     Full Idea: There are two problems with defining the quantifiers in terms of conjunction and disjunction. The general statements are unspecific, and do not say which things have the properties, and also they can't range over infinite objects.
     From: Michael Morris (Guidebook to Wittgenstein's Tractatus [2008], 5C)
     A reaction: That is, the universal quantifier is lots of ands, and the existential is lots of ors. If there only existed finite objects, then naming them all would be universal, and the infinite wouldn't be needed.