display all the ideas for this combination of texts
6 ideas
| 7188 | Logic tries to understand the world according to a man-made scheme [Nietzsche] |
| Full Idea: Logic is the attempt to understand the real world according to a scheme of being that we have posited. | |
| From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Writings from Late Notebooks [1887], 09[97]) | |
| A reaction: This is the ruthless relativist trying to relativise the holy-of-holies, pure logic. I don't believe it. Once you allow counting, identity and sets, based on types, (and why not?) then logic follows. |
| 7145 | Logic is not driven by truth, but desire for a simple single viewpoint [Nietzsche] |
| Full Idea: In logic a drive rules, first of falsifying, and then of implementing a single viewpoint: logic does not originate in the will to truth. | |
| From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Writings from Late Notebooks [1887], 40[13]) | |
| A reaction: Presumably logic derives from a will to simplify rather than a will for truth. Ockham's Razor describes the essence of human thinking. Even if Nietzsche is right, there is still a desire that the simplified view should be true. |
| 7144 | Logic must falsely assume that identical cases exist [Nietzsche] |
| Full Idea: Logic assumes identical cases exist; to think and conclude logically, the fulfilment of this condition must first be feigned. That is: the will to logical truth cannot realise itself until a fundamental falsification of all events has been undertaken. | |
| From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Writings from Late Notebooks [1887], 40[13]) | |
| A reaction: Interesting. This implies that the particularism espoused by virtue theorists (there are no principles, as each case is slightly different) should be extended to other branches of human understanding. So arithmetic is impossible?? |
| 18492 | Not all quantification is either objectual or substitutional [Williamson] |
| Full Idea: We should not assume that all quantification is either objectual or substitutional. | |
| From: Timothy Williamson (Truthmakers and Converse Barcan Formula [1999], p.262) | |
| A reaction: [see Prior 1971:31-4] He talks of quantifying into sentence position. |
| 15136 | Substitutional quantification is metaphysical neutral, and equivalent to a disjunction of instances [Williamson] |
| Full Idea: If quantification into sentence position is substitutional, then it is metaphysically neutral. A substitutionally interpreted 'existential' quantification is semantically equivalent to the disjunction (possibly infinite) of its substitution instances. | |
| From: Timothy Williamson (Truthmakers and Converse Barcan Formula [1999], §2) | |
| A reaction: Is it not committed to the disjunction, just as the objectual reading commits to objects? Something must make the disjunction true. Or is it too verbal to be about reality? |
| 15138 | Not all quantification is objectual or substitutional [Williamson] |
| Full Idea: We should not assume that all quantification is objectual or substitutional. | |
| From: Timothy Williamson (Truthmakers and Converse Barcan Formula [1999], §2) |