Combining Texts

Ideas for 'Good and Evil', 'W.V. Quine' and 'A Conversation: what is it? What is it for?'

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3 ideas

5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 1. Quantification
Traditionally, universal sentences had existential import, but were later treated as conditional claims [Orenstein]
     Full Idea: In traditional logic from Aristotle to Kant, universal sentences have existential import, but Brentano and Boole construed them as universal conditionals (such as 'for anything, if it is a man, then it is mortal').
     From: Alex Orenstein (W.V. Quine [2002], Ch.2)
     A reaction: I am sympathetic to the idea that even the 'existential' quantifier should be treated as conditional, or fictional. Modern Christians may well routinely quantify over angels, without actually being committed to them.
5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 4. Substitutional Quantification
The substitution view of quantification says a sentence is true when there is a substitution instance [Orenstein]
     Full Idea: The substitution view of quantification explains 'there-is-an-x-such-that x is a man' as true when it has a true substitution instance, as in the case of 'Socrates is a man', so the quantifier can be read as 'it is sometimes true that'.
     From: Alex Orenstein (W.V. Quine [2002], Ch.5)
     A reaction: The word 'true' crops up twice here. The alternative (existential-referential) view cites objects, so the substitution view is a more linguistic approach.
5. Theory of Logic / L. Paradox / 2. Aporiai
Before we seek solutions, it is important to invent problems [Deleuze]
     Full Idea: The art of constructing a problem is very important: you invent a problem, a problem-position, before finding a solution.
     From: Gilles Deleuze (A Conversation: what is it? What is it for? [1977], I)
     A reaction: I get the impression that Deleuze prefers problems to solutions, so the activity of exploring the problem is all that really matters. Sceptics accuse philosophers of inventing pseudo-problems. We must first know why 'problematising' is good.