display all the ideas for this combination of texts
5 ideas
17587 | The 'Law' of Excluded Middle needs all propositions to be definitely true or definitely false [Inwagen] |
Full Idea: I think the validity of the 'Law' of Excluded Middle depends on the assumption that every proposition is definitely true or definitely false. | |
From: Peter van Inwagen (Material Beings [1990], 18) | |
A reaction: I think this is confused. He cites vagueness as the problem, but that is a problem for Bivalence. If excluded middle is read as 'true or not-true', that leaves the meaning of 'not-true' open, and never mentions the bivalent 'false'. |
17558 | Variables are just like pronouns; syntactic explanations get muddled over dummy letters [Inwagen] |
Full Idea: Explanations in terms of syntax do not satisfactorily distinguish true variables from dummy or schematic letters. Identifying variables with pronouns, however, provides a genuine explanation of what variables are. | |
From: Peter van Inwagen (Material Beings [1990], 02) | |
A reaction: I like this because it shows that our ordinary thought and speech use variables all the time ('I've forgotten something - what was it?'). He says syntax is fine for maths, but not for ordinary understanding. |
10819 | Tarski gives us the account of truth needed to build a group of true sentences in a model [Field,H] |
Full Idea: Model theory must choose the denotations of the primitives so that all of a group of sentences come out true, so we need a theory of how the truth value of a sentence depends on the denotation of its primitive nonlogical parts, which Tarski gives us. | |
From: Hartry Field (Tarski's Theory of Truth [1972], §1) |
10827 | Model theory is unusual in restricting the range of the quantifiers [Field,H] |
Full Idea: In model theory we are interested in allowing a slightly unusual semantics for quantifiers: we are willing to allow that the quantifier not range over everything. | |
From: Hartry Field (Tarski's Theory of Truth [1972], n 5) |
17583 | There are no heaps [Inwagen] |
Full Idea: Fortunately ....there are no heaps. | |
From: Peter van Inwagen (Material Beings [1990], 18) | |
A reaction: This is the nihilist view of (inorganic) physical objects. If a wild view solves all sorts of problems, one should take it serious. It is why I take reductive physicalism about the mind seriously. (Well, it's true, actually) |