Combining Texts

Ideas for 'Material Beings', 'Formal and Transcendental Logic' and '03: Book of Leviticus'

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5 ideas

5. Theory of Logic / C. Ontology of Logic / 1. Ontology of Logic
21222 Logicians presuppose a world, and ignore logic/world connections, so their logic is impure [Husserl, by Velarde-Mayol]
     Full Idea: Husserl maintained that because most logicians have not studied the connection between logic and the world, logic did not achieve its status of purity. Even more, their logic implicitly presupposed a world.
     From: report of Edmund Husserl (Formal and Transcendental Logic [1929]) by Victor Velarde-Mayol - On Husserl 4.5.1
     A reaction: The point here is that the bracketing of phenomenology, to reach an understanding with no presuppositions, is impossible if you don't realise what your are presupposing. I think the logic/world relationship is badly neglected, thanks to Frege.
21223 Phenomenology grounds logic in subjective experience [Husserl, by Velarde-Mayol]
     Full Idea: The phenomenological logic grounds logical notions in subjective acts of experience.
     From: report of Edmund Husserl (Formal and Transcendental Logic [1929], p.183) by Victor Velarde-Mayol - On Husserl 4.5.1
     A reaction: I'll approach this with great caution, but this is a line of thought that appeals to me. The core assumptions of logic do not arise ex nihilo.
5. Theory of Logic / D. Assumptions for Logic / 2. Excluded Middle
17587 The 'Law' of Excluded Middle needs all propositions to be definitely true or definitely false [Inwagen]
     Full Idea: I think the validity of the 'Law' of Excluded Middle depends on the assumption that every proposition is definitely true or definitely false.
     From: Peter van Inwagen (Material Beings [1990], 18)
     A reaction: I think this is confused. He cites vagueness as the problem, but that is a problem for Bivalence. If excluded middle is read as 'true or not-true', that leaves the meaning of 'not-true' open, and never mentions the bivalent 'false'.
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 4. Variables in Logic
17558 Variables are just like pronouns; syntactic explanations get muddled over dummy letters [Inwagen]
     Full Idea: Explanations in terms of syntax do not satisfactorily distinguish true variables from dummy or schematic letters. Identifying variables with pronouns, however, provides a genuine explanation of what variables are.
     From: Peter van Inwagen (Material Beings [1990], 02)
     A reaction: I like this because it shows that our ordinary thought and speech use variables all the time ('I've forgotten something - what was it?'). He says syntax is fine for maths, but not for ordinary understanding.
5. Theory of Logic / L. Paradox / 6. Paradoxes in Language / b. The Heap paradox ('Sorites')
17583 There are no heaps [Inwagen]
     Full Idea: Fortunately ....there are no heaps.
     From: Peter van Inwagen (Material Beings [1990], 18)
     A reaction: This is the nihilist view of (inorganic) physical objects. If a wild view solves all sorts of problems, one should take it serious. It is why I take reductive physicalism about the mind seriously. (Well, it's true, actually)