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Ideas for 'Natural Goodness', 'A Realistic Theory of Categories' and 'Reference and Modality'

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5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / b. Names as descriptive
Failure of substitutivity shows that a personal name is not purely referential [Quine]
     Full Idea: Failure of substitutivity shows that the occurrence of a personal name is not purely referential.
     From: Willard Quine (Reference and Modality [1953], §1)
     A reaction: I don't think I understand the notion of a name being 'purely' referential, as if it somehow ceased to be a word, and was completely transparent to the named object.