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Ideas for 'Parmenides', 'Abstract Objects' and 'works'

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7 ideas

5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / d. Singular terms
We should decide whether singular terms are genuine by their usage [Hale]
     Full Idea: The criteria for a genuine singular term should pick out not the singular terms themselves but their uses, since they may be genuine in one context and not another.
     From: Bob Hale (Abstract Objects [1987], Ch.2.II)
     A reaction: [rephrased] This will certainly meet problems with vagueness (e.g. as the reference of a singular term is gradually clarified).
Often the same singular term does not ensure reliable inference [Hale]
     Full Idea: In 'the whale is increasingly scarce' and 'the whale is much improved today' (our pet whale), we cannot infer that there is something that is much improved and increasingly scarce, so this singular term fails Dummett's criterion based on inference.
     From: Bob Hale (Abstract Objects [1987], Ch.2)
     A reaction: [much rephrased] This is not just a problem for a few cunningly selected examples. With contortions almost any singular term can be undermined in this way. Singular terms are simply not a useful guide to the existence of abstracta.
Plenty of clear examples have singular terms with no ontological commitment [Hale]
     Full Idea: Some examples where a definite singular noun phrase is not 'genuine' (giving ontological commitment): 'left us in the lurch'; 'for my mother's sake'; 'given the sack'; 'in the nick of time', 'the whereabouts of the PM', 'the identity of the murderer'.
     From: Bob Hale (Abstract Objects [1987], Ch.2.II)
     A reaction: These are not just freakish examples. If I 'go on a journey', that doesn't involve extra entities called 'journeys', just because the meaning is clearer and a more commonplace part of the language.
If singular terms can't be language-neutral, then we face a relativity about their objects [Hale]
     Full Idea: If we lack any general, language-neutral characterization of singular terms, must not a parallel linguistic relativity infect the objects which are to be thought of as their non-linguistic correlates?
     From: Bob Hale (Abstract Objects [1987], Ch.2.III)
     A reaction: Hale thinks he can answer this, but I would have thought that this problem dooms the linguistic approach from the start. There needs to be more imagination about how very different a language could be, while still qualifying as a language.
5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 2. Domain of Quantification
De Morgan introduced a 'universe of discourse', to replace Boole's universe of 'all things' [De Morgan, by Walicki]
     Full Idea: In 1846 De Morgan introduced the enormously influential notion of a possibly arbitrary and stipulated 'universe of discourse'. It replaced Boole's original - and metaphysically a bit suspect - universe of 'all things'.
     From: report of Augustus De Morgan (works [1846]) by Michal Walicki - Introduction to Mathematical Logic History D.1.1
     A reaction: This not only brings formal logic under control, but also reflects normal talk, because there is always an explicit or implicit domain of discourse when we talk. Of virtually any conversation, you can say what it is 'about'.
5. Theory of Logic / L. Paradox / 3. Antinomies
Plato found antinomies in ideas, Kant in space and time, and Bradley in relations [Plato, by Ryle]
     Full Idea: Plato (in 'Parmenides') shows that the theory that 'Eide' are substances, and Kant that space and time are substances, and Bradley that relations are substances, all lead to aninomies.
     From: report of Plato (Parmenides [c.364 BCE]) by Gilbert Ryle - Are there propositions? 'Objections'
Plato's 'Parmenides' is perhaps the best collection of antinomies ever made [Russell on Plato]
     Full Idea: Plato's 'Parmenides' is perhaps the best collection of antinomies ever made.
     From: comment on Plato (Parmenides [c.364 BCE]) by Bertrand Russell - The Principles of Mathematics §337