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Ideas for 'Parmenides', 'Varieties of Things' and 'Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus'

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4 ideas

5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 1. Logical Form
18268 Apparent logical form may not be real logical form [Wittgenstein]
     Full Idea: The apparent logical form of the proposition need not be its real logical form.
     From: Ludwig Wittgenstein (Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus [1921], 4.0031), quoted by J. Alberto Coffa - The Semantic Tradition from Kant to Carnap 6 'The incom'
     A reaction: This is one of the key doctrines of modern analytic philosophy.
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 2. Logical Connectives / a. Logical connectives
10905 My fundamental idea is that the 'logical constants' do not represent [Wittgenstein]
     Full Idea: My fundamental idea is that the 'logical constants' do not represent; that the logic of facts does not allow of representation.
     From: Ludwig Wittgenstein (Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus [1921], 4.0312)
     A reaction: This seems to a firm rebuttal of any sort of platonism about logic, and implies a purely formal account.
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 2. Logical Connectives / c. not
23493 'Not' isn't an object, because not-not-p would then differ from p [Wittgenstein]
     Full Idea: If there were an object called 'not', it would follow that 'not-not-p' would say something different from what 'p' said, just because the one proposition would then be about 'not', and the other would not.
     From: Ludwig Wittgenstein (Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus [1921], 5.44)
     A reaction: That is, the first proposition would be about not-p, and the second would be about p. Assuming we can say what such things are 'about'. A rather good argument that the connectives are not entities. P and double-negated P should be indistinguishable.
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 4. Variables in Logic
7784 'Object' is a pseudo-concept, properly indicated in logic by the variable x [Wittgenstein]
     Full Idea: The variable name ‘x’ is the proper sign of the pseudo-concept object. Wherever the word ‘object’ (‘thing’, ‘entity’, etc.) is rightly used, it is expressed in logical symbolism by the variable name.
     From: Ludwig Wittgenstein (Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus [1921], 4.1272)
     A reaction: This seems to be the germ of Quine's famous dictum (Idea 1610). I am not persuaded that because logic must handle an object as a variable, that it follows that we are dealing with a pseudo-concept. Let logic limp behind life.