Combining Texts

Ideas for 'Parmenides', 'The Boundary Stones of Thought' and 'Philosophies of Mathematics'

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2 ideas

5. Theory of Logic / D. Assumptions for Logic / 1. Bivalence
When faced with vague statements, Bivalence is not a compelling principle [Rumfitt]
     Full Idea: I do not regard Bivalence, when applied to vague statements, as an intuitively compelling principle which we ought to try to preserve.
     From: Ian Rumfitt (The Boundary Stones of Thought [2015], 8.7)
     A reaction: The point of Rumfitt's book is to defend classical logic despite failures of bivalence. He also cites undecidable concepts such as the Continuum Hypothesis.
5. Theory of Logic / D. Assumptions for Logic / 2. Excluded Middle
Asserting Excluded Middle is a hallmark of realism about the natural world [George/Velleman]
     Full Idea: A hallmark of our realist stance towards the natural world is that we are prepared to assert the Law of Excluded Middle for all statements about it. For all statements S, either S is true, or not-S is true.
     From: A.George / D.J.Velleman (Philosophies of Mathematics [2002], Ch.4)
     A reaction: Personally I firmly subscribe to realism, so I suppose I must subscribe to Excluded Middle. ...Provided the statement is properly formulated. Or does liking excluded middle lead me to realism?