display all the ideas for this combination of texts
3 ideas
| 11175 | Logical concepts rest on certain inferences, not on facts about implications [Fine,K] |
| Full Idea: The nature of the logical concepts is given, not by certain logical truths, but by certain logical inferences. What properly belongs to disjunction is the inference from p to (p or q), rather than the fact that p implies (p or q). | |
| From: Kit Fine (Senses of Essence [1995], §3) | |
| A reaction: Does this mean that Fine is wickedly starting with the psychology, rather than with the pure truth of the connection? Frege is shuddering. This view seems to imply that the truth table for 'or' is secondary. |
| 11176 | The property of Property Abstraction says any suitable condition must imply a property [Fine,K] |
| Full Idea: According to the principle of Property Abstraction, there is, for any suitable condition, a property that is possessed by an object just in case it conforms to the condition. This is usually taken to be a second-order logical truth. | |
| From: Kit Fine (Senses of Essence [1995], §4) | |
| A reaction: Fine objects that it is implied that if Socrates is essentially a man, then he essentially has the property of being a man. Like Fine, I think this conclusion is distasteful. A classification is not a property, at least the way most people use 'property'. |
| 11174 | A logical truth is true in virtue of the nature of the logical concepts [Fine,K] |
| Full Idea: One wants to define a logical truth as one that is true in virtue of the nature of the logical concepts. | |
| From: Kit Fine (Senses of Essence [1995], §3) | |
| A reaction: This is part of Fine's project to give a revised account of essence, which includes the essence of concepts as well as the essence of objects. Everyone should pay close attention to this project. |