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Ideas for 'teaching', 'What Does It Take to Refer?' and 'The Dappled World'

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6 ideas

5. Theory of Logic / C. Ontology of Logic / 1. Ontology of Logic
10454 In first-order we can't just assert existence, and it is very hard to deny something's existence [Bach]
     Full Idea: In standard logic we can't straightforwardly say that n exists. We have to resort to using a formula like '∃x(x=n)', but we can't deny n's existence by negating that formula, because standard first-order logic disallows empty names.
     From: Kent Bach (What Does It Take to Refer? [2006], 22.2 L1)
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 3. Constants in Logic
10453 In logic constants play the role of proper names [Bach]
     Full Idea: In standard first-order logic the role of proper names is played by individual constants.
     From: Kent Bach (What Does It Take to Refer? [2006], 22.2 L1)
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / b. Names as descriptive
10452 Proper names can be non-referential - even predicate as well as attributive uses [Bach]
     Full Idea: Like it or not, proper names have non-referential uses, including not only attributive but even predicate uses.
     From: Kent Bach (What Does It Take to Refer? [2006], 22.2 L1)
     A reaction: 'He's a right little Hitler'. 'You're doing a George Bush again'. 'Try to live up to the name of Churchill'.
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / c. Names as referential
10456 Millian names struggle with existence, empty names, identities and attitude ascription [Bach]
     Full Idea: The familiar problems with the Millian view of names are the problem of positive and negative existential statements, empty names, identity sentences, and propositional attitude ascription.
     From: Kent Bach (What Does It Take to Refer? [2006], 22.2 L1)
     A reaction: I take this combination of problems to make an overwhelming case against the daft idea that the semantics of a name amounts to the actual object it picks out. It is a category mistake to attempt to insert a person into a sentence.
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 2. Descriptions / a. Descriptions
10440 An object can be described without being referred to [Bach]
     Full Idea: An object can be described without being referred to.
     From: Kent Bach (What Does It Take to Refer? [2006], Intro)
     A reaction: I'm not clear how this is possible for a well-known object, though it is clearly possible for a speculative object, such as a gadget I would like to buy. In the former case reference seems to occur even if the speaker is trying to avoid it.
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 2. Descriptions / b. Definite descriptions
10444 Definite descriptions can be used to refer, but are not semantically referential [Bach]
     Full Idea: If Russell is, as I believe, basically right, then definite descriptions are the paradigm of singular terms that can be used to refer but are not linguistically (semantically) referential.
     From: Kent Bach (What Does It Take to Refer? [2006], 22.1 s5)
     A reaction: I'm not sure that we can decide what is 'semantically referential'. Most of the things we refer to don't have names. We don't then 'use' definite descriptions (I'm thinking) - they actually DO the job. If we use them, we can 'use' names too?