Combining Texts

Ideas for 'Universal Prescriptivism', 'Plurals and Complexes' and 'Realism, Mathematics and Modality'

unexpand these ideas     |    start again     |     choose another area for these texts

display all the ideas for this combination of texts

---

5 ideas

5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 2. Descriptions / b. Definite descriptions

10671	Plural definite descriptions pick out the largest class of things that fit the description [Hossack]
	Full Idea: If we extend the power of language with plural definite descriptions, these would pick out the largest class of things that fit the description.
	From: Keith Hossack (Plurals and Complexes [2000], 3)

5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 6. Plural Quantification

10666	Plural reference will refer to complex facts without postulating complex things [Hossack]
	Full Idea: It may be that plural reference gives atomism the resources to state complex facts without needing to refer to complex things.
	From: Keith Hossack (Plurals and Complexes [2000], 1)
	A reaction: This seems the most interesting metaphysical implication of the possibility of plural quantification.

10669	Plural reference is just an abbreviation when properties are distributive, but not otherwise [Hossack]
	Full Idea: If all properties are distributive, plural reference is just a handy abbreviation to avoid repetition (as in 'A and B are hungry', to avoid 'A is hungry and B is hungry'), but not all properties are distributive (as in 'some people surround a table').
	From: Keith Hossack (Plurals and Complexes [2000], 2)
	A reaction: The characteristic examples to support plural quantification involve collective activity and relations, which might be weeded out of our basic ontology, thus leaving singular quantification as sufficient.

10675	A plural comprehension principle says there are some things one of which meets some condition [Hossack]
	Full Idea: Singular comprehension principles have a bad reputation, but the plural comprehension principle says that given a condition on individuals, there are some things such that something is one of them iff it meets the condition.
	From: Keith Hossack (Plurals and Complexes [2000], 4)

5. Theory of Logic / L. Paradox / 5. Paradoxes in Set Theory / d. Russell's paradox

10673	Plural language can discuss without inconsistency things that are not members of themselves [Hossack]
	Full Idea: In a plural language we can discuss without fear of inconsistency the things that are not members of themselves.
	From: Keith Hossack (Plurals and Complexes [2000], 4)
	A reaction: [see Hossack for details]