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Ideas for 'A Theory of Conditionals', 'Philosophy of Language' and 'Persistence, Change and Explanation'

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5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / c. Names as referential

7306	If the only property of a name was its reference, we couldn't explain bearerless names [Miller,A]
	Full Idea: If having a reference were the only semantic property in terms of which we could explain the functioning of names, we would be in trouble with respect to names that simply have no bearer.
	From: Alexander Miller (Philosophy of Language [1998], 2.1.1)
	A reaction: (Miller is discussing Frege) 'Odysseus' is given as an example. Instead of switching to a bundle of descriptions, we could say that we just imagine an object which is stamped with the name. Names always try to refer.