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Ideas for 'Philosophical Explanations', 'Lectures 1930-32 (student notes)' and 'Aesthetic as Science of Expression'

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6 ideas

5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 1. Overview of Logic
18724 In logic nothing is hidden [Wittgenstein]
     Full Idea: In logic nothing is hidden.
     From: Ludwig Wittgenstein (Lectures 1930-32 (student notes) [1931], B XII.3)
     A reaction: If so, then the essence of logic must be there for all to see. The rules of natural deduction are a good shot at showing this.
5. Theory of Logic / C. Ontology of Logic / 4. Logic by Convention
18709 Laws of logic are like laws of chess - if you change them, it's just a different game [Wittgenstein]
     Full Idea: I might as well question the laws of logic as the laws of chess. If I change the rules it is a different game and there is an end of it.
     From: Ludwig Wittgenstein (Lectures 1930-32 (student notes) [1931], A XI.3)
     A reaction: No, that isn't the end of it, because there are meta-criteria for preferring one game to another. Why don't we just give up classical logic? It would be such fun to have a wild wacky logic. We can start with 'tonk'.
5. Theory of Logic / D. Assumptions for Logic / 3. Contradiction
18736 Contradiction is between two rules, not between rule and reality [Wittgenstein]
     Full Idea: Contradiction is between one rule and another, not between rule and reality.
     From: Ludwig Wittgenstein (Lectures 1930-32 (student notes) [1931], C XIII)
     A reaction: If I say 'he is sitting' and 'he is standing', it seems to be reality which produces the contradiction. What 'rule' could possibly do it? The rule which says sitting and standing are incompatible? But what makes that so?
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 2. Logical Connectives / c. not
18723 We may correctly use 'not' without making the rule explicit [Wittgenstein]
     Full Idea: Correct use does not imply the ability to make the rules explicit. Understanding 'not' is like understanding a move in chess.
     From: Ludwig Wittgenstein (Lectures 1930-32 (student notes) [1931], B XII.1)
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 2. Logical Connectives / d. and
18718 Saying 'and' has meaning is just saying it works in a sentence [Wittgenstein]
     Full Idea: When we say that the word 'and' has meaning what we mean is that it works in a sentence and is not just a flourish.
     From: Ludwig Wittgenstein (Lectures 1930-32 (student notes) [1931], B VIII.2)
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / a. Names
18727 A person's name doesn't mean their body; bodies don't sit down, and their existence can be denied [Wittgenstein]
     Full Idea: The meaning of the words 'Professor Moore' is not a certain human body, because we do not say that the meaning sits on the sofa, and the words occur in the proposition 'Professor Moore does not exist'.
     From: Ludwig Wittgenstein (Lectures 1930-32 (student notes) [1931], B Easter)
     A reaction: Brilliant. Love it. Kripke ending up denying the existence of 'meanings'.