display all the ideas for this combination of texts
4 ideas
13777 | A name is a sort of tool [Plato] |
Full Idea: A name is a sort of tool. | |
From: Plato (Cratylus [c.377 BCE], 388a) | |
A reaction: Idea 13775 gives a background for this metaphor, from earlier in the text. Wittgenstein has a famous toolkit metaphor for language. The whole of this text, 'Cratylus', is about names. |
13790 | A name-giver might misname something, then force other names to conform to it [Plato] |
Full Idea: The name-giver might have made a mistake at the beginning and then forced the other names to be consistent with it. | |
From: Plato (Cratylus [c.377 BCE], 436c) | |
A reaction: Lovely. This is Gareth Evans's 'Madagascar' example. See Idea 9041. |
13791 | Things must be known before they are named, so it can't be the names that give us knowledge [Plato] |
Full Idea: If things cannot be learned except from their names, how can we possibly claim that the name-givers or rule-setters have knowledge before any names had been given for them to know? | |
From: Plato (Cratylus [c.377 BCE], 438b) | |
A reaction: Running through this is a hostility to philosophy of language, so I find it very congenial. We are animals who relate to the world before language takes a grip. We have full-blown knowledge of things, with no intervention of words. |
13789 | Anyone who knows a thing's name also knows the thing [Plato] |
Full Idea: The simple truth is that anyone who knows a thing's name also knows the thing. | |
From: Plato (Cratylus [c.377 BCE], 435d) | |
A reaction: A nice slogan, but it seems to be blatantly false. The best example is Gareth Evans's of joining in a conversation about a person ('Louis'?), and only gradually tuning in to the person to which the name refers. |