Combining Texts

Ideas for 'Intro to Naming,Necessity and Natural Kinds', 'Virtues and Vices' and 'Modality'

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4 ideas

5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / b. Names as descriptive
5829 We refer to Thales successfully by name, even if all descriptions of him are false [Schwartz,SP]
     Full Idea: We can refer to Thales by using the name "Thales" even though perhaps the only description we can supply is false of him.
     From: Stephen P. Schwartz (Intro to Naming,Necessity and Natural Kinds [1977], §III)
     A reaction: It is not clear what we would be referring to if all of our descriptions (even 'Greek philosopher') were false. If an archaeologist finds just a scrap of stone with a name written on it, that is hardly a sufficient basis for successful reference.
5830 The traditional theory of names says some of the descriptions must be correct [Schwartz,SP]
     Full Idea: The traditional theory of proper names entails that at least some combination of the things ordinarily believed of Aristotle are necessarily true of him.
     From: Stephen P. Schwartz (Intro to Naming,Necessity and Natural Kinds [1977], §III)
     A reaction: Searle endorses this traditional theory. Kripke and co. tried to dismiss it, but you can't. If all descriptions of Aristotle turned out to be false (it was actually the name of a Persian statue), our modern references would have been unsuccessful.
5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 5. Second-Order Quantification
5740 Second-order logic needs second-order variables and quantification into predicate position [Melia]
     Full Idea: Permitting quantification into predicate position and adding second-order variables leads to second-order logic.
     From: Joseph Melia (Modality [2003], Ch.2)
     A reaction: Often expressed by saying that we now quantify over predicates and relations, rather than just objects. Depends on your metaphysical commitments.
5. Theory of Logic / J. Model Theory in Logic / 1. Logical Models
5741 If every model that makes premises true also makes conclusion true, the argument is valid [Melia]
     Full Idea: In first-order predicate calculus validity is defined thus: an argument is valid iff every model that makes the premises of the argument true also makes the conclusion of the argument true.
     From: Joseph Melia (Modality [2003], Ch.2)
     A reaction: See Melia Ch. 2 for an explanation of a 'model'. Traditional views of validity tend to say that if the premises are true the conclusion has to be true (necessarily), but this introduces the modal term 'necessarily', which is controversial.