display all the ideas for this combination of texts
4 ideas
18794 | Logic has precise boundaries, and is the formal rules for all thinking [Kant] |
Full Idea: The boundaries of logic are determined quite precisely by the fact that logic is the science that exhaustively presents and strictly proves nothing but the formal rules of all thinking. | |
From: Immanuel Kant (Critique of Pure Reason [1781], B Pref ix) | |
A reaction: Presumably it does not give the rules for ridiculous thinking, so more will be required. The interesting bit is the universality of the claim. |
4098 | The theory of descriptions supports internalism, since they are thinkable when the object is non-existent [Crane] |
Full Idea: The theory of descriptions gives a model of internalist intentionality, in that it describes cases where the thinkability of a belief does not depend on the existence of a specific object. | |
From: Tim Crane (Elements of Mind [2001], 4.36) | |
A reaction: So what do externalists say about the theory? Surely a reference to 'water' can't entail the existence of water? |
5542 | There must be a general content-free account of truth in the rules of logic [Kant] |
Full Idea: Concerning the mere form of cognition (setting aside all content), it is equally clear that a logic, so far as it expounds the general and necessary rules of understanding, must present criteria of truth in these very rules. | |
From: Immanuel Kant (Critique of Pure Reason [1781], B084/A59) | |
A reaction: A vital point, used by Putnam (Idea 2332) in his critique of machine functionalism. It is hard to see how we can think of logic as pure syntax if the concept of truth is needed. We may observe one Venn circle inside another, but interpretaton is required. |
21454 | The battle of the antinomies is usually won by the attacker, and lost by any defender [Kant] |
Full Idea: These sophistical assertions [the antinomies] open us a dialectical battlefield where each party will keep the upper hand as long as it is allowed to attack, and will certainly defeat that which is compelled to conduct itself merely defensively. | |
From: Immanuel Kant (Critique of Pure Reason [1781], B450/A423) | |
A reaction: This seems related to the interesting question of where the 'onus of proof' lies in a major dispute. Kant's implication is that the battles are not rational, if they are settled in such a fashion. |