Combining Texts

Ideas for 'Axiomatic Theories of Truth (2005 ver)', 'Vindication of Religion (extract)' and 'Truth and Meaning'

unexpand these ideas     |    start again     |     choose another area for these texts

display all the ideas for this combination of texts

---

3 ideas

5. Theory of Logic / C. Ontology of Logic / 1. Ontology of Logic

15652	We can use truth instead of ontologically loaded second-order comprehension assumptions about properties [Halbach]
	Full Idea: The reduction of 2nd-order theories (of properties or sets) to axiomatic theories of truth may be conceived as a form of reductive nominalism, replacing existence assumptions (for comprehension axioms) by ontologically innocent truth assumptions.
	From: Volker Halbach (Axiomatic Theories of Truth (2005 ver) [2005], 1.1)
	A reaction: I like this very much, as weeding properties out of logic (without weeding them out of the world). So-called properties in logic are too abundant, so there is a misfit with their role in science.

5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 1. Logical Form

7332	There is a huge range of sentences of which we do not know the logical form [Davidson]
	Full Idea: We do not know the logical form of sentences about counterfactuals, probabilities, causal relations, belief, perception, intention, purposeful action, imperatives, optatives, or interrogatives, or the role of adverbs, adjectives or mass terms.
	From: Donald Davidson (Truth and Meaning [1967], p.35)
	A reaction: [compressed] This is the famous 'Davidson programme', where teams of philosophers work out the logical forms for this lot, thus unravelling the logic of the world. If they are beavering away, some sort of overview should have emerged by now...

5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 7. Predicates in Logic

15651	Instead of saying x has a property, we can say a formula is true of x - as long as we have 'true' [Halbach]
	Full Idea: Quantification over (certain) properties can be mimicked in a language with a truth predicate by quantifying over formulas. Instead of saying that Tom has the property of being a poor philosopher, we can say 'x is a poor philosopher' is true of Tom.
	From: Volker Halbach (Axiomatic Theories of Truth (2005 ver) [2005], 1.1)
	A reaction: I love this, and think it is very important. He talks of 'mimicking' properties, but I see it as philosophers mistakenly attributing properties, when actually what they were doing is asserting truths involving certain predicates.