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Ideas for 'Axiomatic Theories of Truth (2005 ver)', 'Basic Problems of Phenomenology' and 'The Evolution of Modern Metaphysics'

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3 ideas

5. Theory of Logic / C. Ontology of Logic / 1. Ontology of Logic

15652	We can use truth instead of ontologically loaded second-order comprehension assumptions about properties [Halbach]
	Full Idea: The reduction of 2nd-order theories (of properties or sets) to axiomatic theories of truth may be conceived as a form of reductive nominalism, replacing existence assumptions (for comprehension axioms) by ontologically innocent truth assumptions.
	From: Volker Halbach (Axiomatic Theories of Truth (2005 ver) [2005], 1.1)
	A reaction: I like this very much, as weeding properties out of logic (without weeding them out of the world). So-called properties in logic are too abundant, so there is a misfit with their role in science.

5. Theory of Logic / C. Ontology of Logic / 2. Platonism in Logic

15571	The idea of an atemporal realm of validity is as implausible as medieval theology [Heidegger]
	Full Idea: The whole idea of an atemporal realm of validity is an invention that is no less doubtful than medieval speculation about angels.
	From: Martin Heidegger (Basic Problems of Phenomenology [1927], p.215), quoted by Richard Polt - Heidegger: an introduction 2 'Theory'
	A reaction: This seems to be flatly opposed to the view of Frege, and shows why continental philosophy has largely eschewed a study of logic. It is hard for a philosopher to pursue logic extensively without commitment to the Fregean Third Realm.

5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 7. Predicates in Logic

15651	Instead of saying x has a property, we can say a formula is true of x - as long as we have 'true' [Halbach]
	Full Idea: Quantification over (certain) properties can be mimicked in a language with a truth predicate by quantifying over formulas. Instead of saying that Tom has the property of being a poor philosopher, we can say 'x is a poor philosopher' is true of Tom.
	From: Volker Halbach (Axiomatic Theories of Truth (2005 ver) [2005], 1.1)
	A reaction: I love this, and think it is very important. He talks of 'mimicking' properties, but I see it as philosophers mistakenly attributing properties, when actually what they were doing is asserting truths involving certain predicates.