display all the ideas for this combination of texts
14 ideas
13845 | The various logics are abstractions made from terms like 'if...then' in English [Hacking] |
Full Idea: I don't believe English is by nature classical or intuitionistic etc. These are abstractions made by logicians. Logicians attend to numerous different objects that might be served by 'If...then', like material conditional, strict or relevant implication. | |
From: Ian Hacking (What is Logic? [1979], §15) | |
A reaction: The idea that they are 'abstractions' is close to my heart. Abstractions from what? Surely 'if...then' has a standard character when employed in normal conversation? |
13840 | First-order logic is the strongest complete compact theory with Löwenheim-Skolem [Hacking] |
Full Idea: First-order logic is the strongest complete compact theory with a Löwenheim-Skolem theorem. | |
From: Ian Hacking (What is Logic? [1979], §13) |
13844 | A limitation of first-order logic is that it cannot handle branching quantifiers [Hacking] |
Full Idea: Henkin proved that there is no first-order treatment of branching quantifiers, which do not seem to involve any idea that is fundamentally different from ordinary quantification. | |
From: Ian Hacking (What is Logic? [1979], §13) | |
A reaction: See Hacking for an example of branching quantifiers. Hacking is impressed by this as a real limitation of the first-order logic which he generally favours. |
15326 | Doubt is thrown on classical logic by the way it so easily produces the liar paradox [Horsten] |
Full Idea: Aside from logic, so little is needed to generate the liar paradox that one wonders whether the laws of classical logic are unrestrictedly valid after all. (Many theories of truth have therefore been formulated in nonclassical logic.) | |
From: Leon Horsten (The Tarskian Turn [2011], 01.2) | |
A reaction: Kripke uses Strong Kleene logic for his theory. The implication is that debates discussed by Horsten actually have the status of classical logic at stake, as well as the nature of truth. |
13842 | Second-order completeness seems to need intensional entities and possible worlds [Hacking] |
Full Idea: Second-order logic has no chance of a completeness theorem unless one ventures into intensional entities and possible worlds. | |
From: Ian Hacking (What is Logic? [1979], §13) |
15341 | Deduction Theorem: ψ only derivable from φ iff φ→ψ are axioms [Horsten] |
Full Idea: The Deduction Theorem says ψ is derivable in classical predicate logic from ψ iff the sentence φ→ψ is a theorem of classical logic. Hence inferring φ to ψ is truth-preserving iff the axiom scheme φ→ψ is provable. | |
From: Leon Horsten (The Tarskian Turn [2011], 02.2) | |
A reaction: Horsten offers this to show that the Tarski bi-conditionals can themselves be justified, and not just the rule of inference involved. Apparently you can only derive something if you first announce that you have the ability to derive it. Odd. |
13837 | With a pure notion of truth and consequence, the meanings of connectives are fixed syntactically [Hacking] |
Full Idea: My doctrine is that the peculiarity of the logical constants resides precisely in that given a certain pure notion of truth and consequence, all the desirable semantic properties of the constants are determined by their syntactic properties. | |
From: Ian Hacking (What is Logic? [1979], §09) | |
A reaction: He opposes this to Peacocke 1976, who claims that the logical connectives are essentially semantic in character, concerned with the preservation of truth. |
13839 | Perhaps variables could be dispensed with, by arrows joining places in the scope of quantifiers [Hacking] |
Full Idea: For some purposes the variables of first-order logic can be regarded as prepositions and place-holders that could in principle be dispensed with, say by a system of arrows indicating what places fall in the scope of which quantifier. | |
From: Ian Hacking (What is Logic? [1979], §11) | |
A reaction: I tend to think of variables as either pronouns, or as definite descriptions, or as temporary names, but not as prepositions. Must address this new idea... |
15328 | A theory is 'non-conservative' if it facilitates new mathematical proofs [Horsten] |
Full Idea: A theory is 'non-conservative' if it allows us to prove mathematical facts that go beyond what the background mathematical theory can prove on its own. | |
From: Leon Horsten (The Tarskian Turn [2011], 01.4) | |
A reaction: This is an instance of the relationship with mathematics being used as the test case for explorations of logic. It is a standard research method, because it is so precise, but should not be mistaken for the last word about a theory. |
15349 | It is easier to imagine truth-value gaps (for the Liar, say) than for truth-value gluts (both T and F) [Horsten] |
Full Idea: It is easier to imagine what it is like for a sentence to lack a truth value than what it is like for a sentence to be both truth and false. So I am grudgingly willing to entertain the possibility that certain sentences (like the Liar) lack a truth value. | |
From: Leon Horsten (The Tarskian Turn [2011], 02.5) | |
A reaction: Fans of truth value gluts are dialethists like Graham Priest. I'm with Horsten on this one. But in what way can a sentence be meaningful if it lacks a truth-value? He mentions unfulfilled presuppositions and indicative conditionals as gappy. |
15366 | Satisfaction is a primitive notion, and very liable to semantical paradoxes [Horsten] |
Full Idea: Satisfaction is a more primitive notion than truth, and it is even more susceptible to semantical paradoxes than the truth predicate. | |
From: Leon Horsten (The Tarskian Turn [2011], 06.3) | |
A reaction: The Liar is the best known paradox here. Tarski bases his account of truth on this primitive notion, so Horsten is pointing out the difficulties. |
13843 | If it is a logic, the Löwenheim-Skolem theorem holds for it [Hacking] |
Full Idea: A Löwenheim-Skolem theorem holds for anything which, on my delineation, is a logic. | |
From: Ian Hacking (What is Logic? [1979], §13) | |
A reaction: I take this to be an unusually conservative view. Shapiro is the chap who can give you an alternative view of these things, or Boolos. |
15353 | The first incompleteness theorem means that consistency does not entail soundness [Horsten] |
Full Idea: It is a lesson of the first incompleteness theorem that consistency does not entail soundness. If we add the negation of the gödel sentence for PA as an extra axiom to PA, the result is consistent. This negation is false, so the theory is unsound. | |
From: Leon Horsten (The Tarskian Turn [2011], 04.3) |
15355 | Strengthened Liar: 'this sentence is not true in any context' - in no context can this be evaluated [Horsten] |
Full Idea: The Strengthened Liar sentence says 'this sentence is not true in any context'. It is not hard to figure out that there is no context in which the sentence can be coherently evaluated. | |
From: Leon Horsten (The Tarskian Turn [2011], 04.6) |