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'fragments/reports', 'On Sense and Reference' and 'The Tarskian Turn'
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18 ideas
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 6. Classical Logic
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15326
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Doubt is thrown on classical logic by the way it so easily produces the liar paradox [Horsten]
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5. Theory of Logic / B. Logical Consequence / 5. Modus Ponens
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15341
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Deduction Theorem: ψ only derivable from φ iff φ→ψ are axioms [Horsten]
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5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 8. Theories in Logic
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15328
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A theory is 'non-conservative' if it facilitates new mathematical proofs [Horsten]
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5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / a. Names
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18772
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We can treat designation by a few words as a proper name [Frege]
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5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / b. Names as descriptive
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14075
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Proper name in modal contexts refer obliquely, to their usual sense [Frege, by Gibbard]
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10424
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A Fregean proper name has a sense determining an object, instead of a concept [Frege, by Sainsbury]
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18773
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People may have different senses for 'Aristotle', like 'pupil of Plato' or 'teacher of Alexander' [Frege]
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5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / c. Names as referential
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4978
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The meaning of a proper name is the designated object [Frege]
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5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / d. Singular terms
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10510
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Frege ascribes reference to incomplete expressions, as well as to singular terms [Frege, by Hale]
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5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / e. Empty names
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18940
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It is a weakness of natural languages to contain non-denoting names [Frege]
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18937
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If sentences have a 'sense', empty name sentences can be understood that way [Frege, by Sawyer]
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18939
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In a logically perfect language every well-formed proper name designates an object [Frege]
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5. Theory of Logic / I. Semantics of Logic / 1. Semantics of Logic
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15349
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It is easier to imagine truth-value gaps (for the Liar, say) than for truth-value gluts (both T and F) [Horsten]
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5. Theory of Logic / I. Semantics of Logic / 4. Satisfaction
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15366
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Satisfaction is a primitive notion, and very liable to semantical paradoxes [Horsten]
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5. Theory of Logic / I. Semantics of Logic / 6. Intensionalism
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9462
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Frege is intensionalist about reference, as it is determined by sense; identity of objects comes first [Frege, by Jacquette]
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18936
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Frege moved from extensional to intensional semantics when he added the idea of 'sense' [Frege, by Sawyer]
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5. Theory of Logic / K. Features of Logics / 5. Incompleteness
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15353
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The first incompleteness theorem means that consistency does not entail soundness [Horsten]
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5. Theory of Logic / L. Paradox / 6. Paradoxes in Language / a. The Liar paradox
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15355
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Strengthened Liar: 'this sentence is not true in any context' - in no context can this be evaluated [Horsten]
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