Combining Texts

Ideas for 'Katzav on limitations of dispositions', 'The Tarskian Turn' and 'Lectures 1930-32 (student notes)'

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13 ideas

5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 1. Overview of Logic
18724 In logic nothing is hidden [Wittgenstein]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 6. Classical Logic
15326 Doubt is thrown on classical logic by the way it so easily produces the liar paradox [Horsten]
5. Theory of Logic / B. Logical Consequence / 5. Modus Ponens
15341 Deduction Theorem: ψ only derivable from φ iff φ→ψ are axioms [Horsten]
5. Theory of Logic / C. Ontology of Logic / 4. Logic by Convention
18709 Laws of logic are like laws of chess - if you change them, it's just a different game [Wittgenstein]
5. Theory of Logic / D. Assumptions for Logic / 3. Contradiction
18736 Contradiction is between two rules, not between rule and reality [Wittgenstein]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 2. Logical Connectives / c. not
18723 We may correctly use 'not' without making the rule explicit [Wittgenstein]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 2. Logical Connectives / d. and
18718 Saying 'and' has meaning is just saying it works in a sentence [Wittgenstein]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 8. Theories in Logic
15328 A theory is 'non-conservative' if it facilitates new mathematical proofs [Horsten]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / a. Names
18727 A person's name doesn't mean their body; bodies don't sit down, and their existence can be denied [Wittgenstein]
5. Theory of Logic / I. Semantics of Logic / 1. Semantics of Logic
15349 It is easier to imagine truth-value gaps (for the Liar, say) than for truth-value gluts (both T and F) [Horsten]
5. Theory of Logic / I. Semantics of Logic / 4. Satisfaction
15366 Satisfaction is a primitive notion, and very liable to semantical paradoxes [Horsten]
5. Theory of Logic / K. Features of Logics / 5. Incompleteness
15353 The first incompleteness theorem means that consistency does not entail soundness [Horsten]
5. Theory of Logic / L. Paradox / 6. Paradoxes in Language / a. The Liar paradox
15355 Strengthened Liar: 'this sentence is not true in any context' - in no context can this be evaluated [Horsten]