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Ideas for 'The Fixation of Belief', 'Axiomatic Theories of Truth' and 'What Does It Take to Refer?'

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13 ideas

5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 6. Classical Logic
16333 The underestimated costs of giving up classical logic are found in mathematical reasoning [Halbach]
5. Theory of Logic / C. Ontology of Logic / 1. Ontology of Logic
10454 In first-order we can't just assert existence, and it is very hard to deny something's existence [Bach]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 3. Constants in Logic
10453 In logic constants play the role of proper names [Bach]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 8. Theories in Logic
16310 A theory is some formulae and all of their consequences [Halbach]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / b. Names as descriptive
10452 Proper names can be non-referential - even predicate as well as attributive uses [Bach]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / c. Names as referential
10456 Millian names struggle with existence, empty names, identities and attitude ascription [Bach]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 2. Descriptions / a. Descriptions
10440 An object can be described without being referred to [Bach]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 2. Descriptions / b. Definite descriptions
10444 Definite descriptions can be used to refer, but are not semantically referential [Bach]
5. Theory of Logic / K. Features of Logics / 3. Soundness
16341 Normally we only endorse a theory if we believe it to be sound [Halbach]
16344 Soundness must involve truth; the soundness of PA certainly needs it [Halbach]
16342 You cannot just say all of Peano arithmetic is true, as 'true' isn't part of the system [Halbach]
5. Theory of Logic / L. Paradox / 1. Paradox
16347 Many new paradoxes may await us when we study interactions between frameworks [Halbach]
5. Theory of Logic / L. Paradox / 6. Paradoxes in Language / a. The Liar paradox
16336 The liar paradox applies truth to a negated truth (but the conditional will serve equally) [Halbach]