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Ideas for 'fragments/reports', 'Proper Names' and 'On Sense and Reference'

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18 ideas

5. Theory of Logic / B. Logical Consequence / 5. Modus Ponens
8078 Modus ponens is one of five inference rules identified by the Stoics [Chrysippus, by Devlin]
5. Theory of Logic / D. Assumptions for Logic / 2. Excluded Middle
6023 Every proposition is either true or false [Chrysippus, by Cicero]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / a. Names
18772 We can treat designation by a few words as a proper name [Frege]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / b. Names as descriptive
14075 Proper name in modal contexts refer obliquely, to their usual sense [Frege, by Gibbard]
10424 A Fregean proper name has a sense determining an object, instead of a concept [Frege, by Sainsbury]
18773 People may have different senses for 'Aristotle', like 'pupil of Plato' or 'teacher of Alexander' [Frege]
7746 We don't normally think of names as having senses (e.g. we don't give definitions of them) [Searle]
7747 How can a proper name be correlated with its object if it hasn't got a sense? [Searle]
7748 'Aristotle' means more than just 'an object that was christened "Aristotle"' [Searle]
7749 Reference for proper names presupposes a set of uniquely referring descriptions [Searle]
7750 Proper names are logically connected with their characteristics, in a loose way [Searle]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / c. Names as referential
4978 The meaning of a proper name is the designated object [Frege]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / d. Singular terms
10510 Frege ascribes reference to incomplete expressions, as well as to singular terms [Frege, by Hale]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / e. Empty names
18940 It is a weakness of natural languages to contain non-denoting names [Frege]
18937 If sentences have a 'sense', empty name sentences can be understood that way [Frege, by Sawyer]
18939 In a logically perfect language every well-formed proper name designates an object [Frege]
5. Theory of Logic / I. Semantics of Logic / 6. Intensionalism
9462 Frege is intensionalist about reference, as it is determined by sense; identity of objects comes first [Frege, by Jacquette]
18936 Frege moved from extensional to intensional semantics when he added the idea of 'sense' [Frege, by Sawyer]