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Ideas for
'Intermediate Logic', 'works' and 'Being and Nothingness'
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11 ideas
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / a. Names
13360
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In logic, a name is just any expression which refers to a particular single object [Bostock]
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5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / b. Names as descriptive
21878
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Names have a subjective aspect, especially the role of our own name [Derrida]
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21889
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'I' is the perfect name, because it denotes without description [Derrida]
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5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / c. Names as referential
21879
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Even Kripke can't explain names; the word is the thing, and the thing is the word [Derrida]
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5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / e. Empty names
13361
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An expression is only a name if it succeeds in referring to a real object [Bostock]
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5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 2. Descriptions / b. Definite descriptions
13814
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Definite desciptions resemble names, but can't actually be names, if they don't always refer [Bostock]
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13816
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Because of scope problems, definite descriptions are best treated as quantifiers [Bostock]
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13817
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Definite descriptions are usually treated like names, and are just like them if they uniquely refer [Bostock]
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13848
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We are only obliged to treat definite descriptions as non-names if only the former have scope [Bostock]
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13813
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Definite descriptions don't always pick out one thing, as in denials of existence, or errors [Bostock]
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5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 2. Descriptions / c. Theory of definite descriptions
13815
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Names do not have scope problems (e.g. in placing negation), but Russell's account does have that problem [Bostock]
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