Combining Texts
Ideas for
'Dialektik', 'The Intentional Fallacy' and 'Philosophical Logic'
expand these ideas
|
start again
|
choose
another area for these texts
display all the ideas for this combination of texts
18 ideas
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 4. Pure Logic
|
15404
|
Technical people see logic as any formal system that can be studied, not a study of argument validity [Burgess]
|
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 6. Classical Logic
|
15405
|
Classical logic neglects the non-mathematical, such as temporality or modality [Burgess]
|
|
15427
|
The Cut Rule expresses the classical idea that entailment is transitive [Burgess]
|
|
15421
|
Classical logic neglects counterfactuals, temporality and modality, because maths doesn't use them [Burgess]
|
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 9. Philosophical Logic
|
15403
|
Philosophical logic is a branch of logic, and is now centred in computer science [Burgess]
|
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 2. Logical Connectives / a. Logical connectives
|
15407
|
Formalising arguments favours lots of connectives; proving things favours having very few [Burgess]
|
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 2. Logical Connectives / e. or
|
15424
|
Asserting a disjunction from one disjunct seems odd, but can be sensible, and needed in maths [Burgess]
|
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 4. Variables in Logic
|
15409
|
All occurrences of variables in atomic formulas are free [Burgess]
|
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 2. Descriptions / b. Definite descriptions
|
15414
|
The denotation of a definite description is flexible, rather than rigid [Burgess]
|
5. Theory of Logic / H. Proof Systems / 1. Proof Systems
|
15406
|
'Induction' and 'recursion' on complexity prove by connecting a formula to its atomic components [Burgess]
|
5. Theory of Logic / H. Proof Systems / 6. Sequent Calculi
|
15425
|
The sequent calculus makes it possible to have proof without transitivity of entailment [Burgess]
|
|
15426
|
We can build one expanding sequence, instead of a chain of deductions [Burgess]
|
5. Theory of Logic / I. Semantics of Logic / 3. Logical Truth
|
15408
|
'Tautologies' are valid formulas of classical sentential logic - or substitution instances in other logics [Burgess]
|
5. Theory of Logic / I. Semantics of Logic / 4. Satisfaction
|
15418
|
Validity (for truth) and demonstrability (for proof) have correlates in satisfiability and consistency [Burgess]
|
5. Theory of Logic / J. Model Theory in Logic / 1. Logical Models
|
15412
|
Models leave out meaning, and just focus on truth values [Burgess]
|
|
15411
|
We only need to study mathematical models, since all other models are isomorphic to these [Burgess]
|
|
15416
|
We aim to get the technical notion of truth in all models matching intuitive truth in all instances [Burgess]
|
5. Theory of Logic / L. Paradox / 6. Paradoxes in Language / a. The Liar paradox
|
15428
|
The Liar seems like a truth-value 'gap', but dialethists see it as a 'glut' [Burgess]
|