Combining Texts
Ideas for
'Logical Consequence', 'The Tarskian Turn' and 'Properties and Predicates'
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13 ideas
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 4. Pure Logic
10690
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Formal logic is invariant under permutations, or devoid of content, or gives the norms for thought [Beall/Restall]
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5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 6. Classical Logic
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Doubt is thrown on classical logic by the way it so easily produces the liar paradox [Horsten]
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5. Theory of Logic / B. Logical Consequence / 2. Types of Consequence
10691
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Logical consequence needs either proofs, or absence of counterexamples [Beall/Restall]
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5. Theory of Logic / B. Logical Consequence / 4. Semantic Consequence |=
10695
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Logical consequence is either necessary truth preservation, or preservation based on interpretation [Beall/Restall]
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5. Theory of Logic / B. Logical Consequence / 5. Modus Ponens
15341
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Deduction Theorem: ψ only derivable from φ iff φ→ψ are axioms [Horsten]
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5. Theory of Logic / B. Logical Consequence / 8. Material Implication
10689
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A step is a 'material consequence' if we need contents as well as form [Beall/Restall]
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5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 8. Theories in Logic
15328
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A theory is 'non-conservative' if it facilitates new mathematical proofs [Horsten]
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5. Theory of Logic / I. Semantics of Logic / 1. Semantics of Logic
15349
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It is easier to imagine truth-value gaps (for the Liar, say) than for truth-value gluts (both T and F) [Horsten]
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5. Theory of Logic / I. Semantics of Logic / 3. Logical Truth
10696
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A 'logical truth' (or 'tautology', or 'theorem') follows from empty premises [Beall/Restall]
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5. Theory of Logic / I. Semantics of Logic / 4. Satisfaction
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Satisfaction is a primitive notion, and very liable to semantical paradoxes [Horsten]
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5. Theory of Logic / J. Model Theory in Logic / 1. Logical Models
10693
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Models are mathematical structures which interpret the non-logical primitives [Beall/Restall]
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5. Theory of Logic / K. Features of Logics / 5. Incompleteness
15353
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The first incompleteness theorem means that consistency does not entail soundness [Horsten]
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5. Theory of Logic / L. Paradox / 6. Paradoxes in Language / a. The Liar paradox
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Strengthened Liar: 'this sentence is not true in any context' - in no context can this be evaluated [Horsten]
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