Combining Texts
Ideas for
'Logical Pluralism', 'Cratylus' and 'Philosophy without Intuitions'
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13 ideas
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 1. Overview of Logic
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13235
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Logic studies consequence; logical truths are consequences of everything, or nothing [Beall/Restall]
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13238
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Syllogisms are only logic when they use variables, and not concrete terms [Beall/Restall]
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5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 2. History of Logic
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13234
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The view of logic as knowing a body of truths looks out-of-date [Beall/Restall]
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5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 4. Pure Logic
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13232
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Logic studies arguments, not formal languages; this involves interpretations [Beall/Restall]
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5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 8. Logic of Mathematics
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13241
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The model theory of classical predicate logic is mathematics [Beall/Restall]
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5. Theory of Logic / B. Logical Consequence / 2. Types of Consequence
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13253
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There are several different consequence relations [Beall/Restall]
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5. Theory of Logic / B. Logical Consequence / 4. Semantic Consequence |=
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13240
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A sentence follows from others if they always model it [Beall/Restall]
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5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / a. Names
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13777
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A name is a sort of tool [Plato]
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13790
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A name-giver might misname something, then force other names to conform to it [Plato]
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13791
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Things must be known before they are named, so it can't be the names that give us knowledge [Plato]
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5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / c. Names as referential
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13789
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Anyone who knows a thing's name also knows the thing [Plato]
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5. Theory of Logic / I. Semantics of Logic / 3. Logical Truth
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13236
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Logical truth is much more important if mathematics rests on it, as logicism claims [Beall/Restall]
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5. Theory of Logic / L. Paradox / 6. Paradoxes in Language / d. The Preface paradox
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13237
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Preface Paradox affirms and denies the conjunction of propositions in the book [Beall/Restall]
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