Combining Texts
Ideas for
'Possibility', 'Set Theory and Its Philosophy' and 'What Does It Take to Refer?'
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14 ideas
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 3. Value of Logic
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13378
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It is a mistake to think that the logic developed for mathematics can clarify language and philosophy [Jubien]
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5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 7. Second-Order Logic
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10704
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We can formalize second-order formation rules, but not inference rules [Potter]
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5. Theory of Logic / C. Ontology of Logic / 1. Ontology of Logic
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10454
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In first-order we can't just assert existence, and it is very hard to deny something's existence [Bach]
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5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 3. Constants in Logic
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10453
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In logic constants play the role of proper names [Bach]
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5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / a. Names
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13402
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We only grasp a name if we know whether to apply it when the bearer changes [Jubien]
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13405
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The baptiser picks the bearer of a name, but social use decides the category [Jubien]
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5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / b. Names as descriptive
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10452
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Proper names can be non-referential - even predicate as well as attributive uses [Bach]
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5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / c. Names as referential
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13399
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Examples show that ordinary proper names are not rigid designators [Jubien]
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10456
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Millian names struggle with existence, empty names, identities and attitude ascription [Bach]
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5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 2. Descriptions / a. Descriptions
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10440
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An object can be described without being referred to [Bach]
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5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 2. Descriptions / b. Definite descriptions
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10444
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Definite descriptions can be used to refer, but are not semantically referential [Bach]
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13398
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We could make a contingent description into a rigid and necessary one by adding 'actual' to it [Jubien]
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5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 3. Objectual Quantification
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13392
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Philosophers reduce complex English kind-quantifiers to the simplistic first-order quantifier [Jubien]
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5. Theory of Logic / H. Proof Systems / 3. Proof from Assumptions
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10703
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Supposing axioms (rather than accepting them) give truths, but they are conditional [Potter]
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