Combining Texts
Ideas for
'Possibility', 'Set Theory and Its Philosophy' and 'What Does It Take to Refer?'
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8 ideas
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / a. Names
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13402
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We only grasp a name if we know whether to apply it when the bearer changes [Jubien]
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13405
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The baptiser picks the bearer of a name, but social use decides the category [Jubien]
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5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / b. Names as descriptive
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10452
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Proper names can be non-referential - even predicate as well as attributive uses [Bach]
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5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / c. Names as referential
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13399
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Examples show that ordinary proper names are not rigid designators [Jubien]
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10456
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Millian names struggle with existence, empty names, identities and attitude ascription [Bach]
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5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 2. Descriptions / a. Descriptions
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10440
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An object can be described without being referred to [Bach]
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5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 2. Descriptions / b. Definite descriptions
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10444
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Definite descriptions can be used to refer, but are not semantically referential [Bach]
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13398
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We could make a contingent description into a rigid and necessary one by adding 'actual' to it [Jubien]
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