Combining Texts
Ideas for
'Axiomatic Theories of Truth', 'Reference and Definite Descriptions' and 'Counterfactuals'
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11 ideas
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 6. Classical Logic
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16333
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The underestimated costs of giving up classical logic are found in mathematical reasoning [Halbach]
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5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 8. Theories in Logic
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16310
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A theory is some formulae and all of their consequences [Halbach]
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5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 2. Descriptions / a. Descriptions
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7760
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Russell only uses descriptions attributively, and Strawson only referentially [Donnellan, by Lycan]
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5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 2. Descriptions / b. Definite descriptions
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5811
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A definite description can have a non-referential use [Donnellan]
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5812
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Definite descriptions are 'attributive' if they say something about x, and 'referential' if they pick x out [Donnellan]
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5814
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'The x is F' only presumes that x exists; it does not actually entail the existence [Donnellan]
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5. Theory of Logic / K. Features of Logics / 3. Soundness
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16342
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You cannot just say all of Peano arithmetic is true, as 'true' isn't part of the system [Halbach]
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16341
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Normally we only endorse a theory if we believe it to be sound [Halbach]
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16344
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Soundness must involve truth; the soundness of PA certainly needs it [Halbach]
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5. Theory of Logic / L. Paradox / 1. Paradox
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16347
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Many new paradoxes may await us when we study interactions between frameworks [Halbach]
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5. Theory of Logic / L. Paradox / 6. Paradoxes in Language / a. The Liar paradox
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16336
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The liar paradox applies truth to a negated truth (but the conditional will serve equally) [Halbach]
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