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Ideas for 'fragments/reports', 'Set Theory and Its Philosophy' and 'Words without Objects'

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4 ideas

6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 4. Using Numbers / c. Counting procedure
If set theory didn't found mathematics, it is still needed to count infinite sets [Potter]
     Full Idea: Even if set theory's role as a foundation for mathematics turned out to be wholly illusory, it would earn its keep through the calculus it provides for counting infinite sets.
     From: Michael Potter (Set Theory and Its Philosophy [2004], 03.8)
Some non-count nouns can be used for counting, as in 'several wines' or 'fewer cheeses' [Laycock]
     Full Idea: The very words we class as non-count nouns may themselves be used for counting, of kinds or types, and phrases like 'several wines' are perfectly in order. ...Not only do we have 'less cheese', but we also have the non-generic 'fewer cheeses'.
     From: Henry Laycock (Words without Objects [2006], Intro 4 n23)
     A reaction: [compressed] Laycock generally endorses the thought that what can be counted is not simply distinguished by a precise class of applied vocabulary. He offers lots of borderline or ambiguous cases in his footnotes.
Some apparent non-count words can take plural forms, such as 'snows' or 'waters' [Laycock]
     Full Idea: Some words that seem to be semantically non-count can take syntactically plural forms: 'snows', 'sands', 'waters' and the like.
     From: Henry Laycock (Words without Objects [2006], Intro 4 n24)
     A reaction: This seems to involve parcels of the stuff. The 'snows of yesteryear' occur at different times. 'Taking the waters' probably involves occasions. The 'Arabian sands' presumably occur in different areas. Semantics won't fix what is countable.
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 4. Axioms for Number / d. Peano arithmetic
It is remarkable that all natural number arithmetic derives from just the Peano Axioms [Potter]
     Full Idea: It is a remarkable fact that all the arithmetical properties of the natural numbers can be derived from such a small number of assumptions (as the Peano Axioms).
     From: Michael Potter (Set Theory and Its Philosophy [2004], 05.2)
     A reaction: If one were to defend essentialism about arithmetic, this would be grist to their mill. I'm just saying.